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Historically, the commissioners of the U.S. professional sports league
have had a duty to preserve the integrity of the leagues. Developing from
this concept through collective bargaining between the leagues and
players’ associations, the disciplinary systems of the leagues are designed
to keep conflicts out of the U.S. courts. Recently, these systems have come
under considerable public scrutiny questioning their fairness and
effectiveness and, in some cases, the integrity of the commissioners and
sports. Specifically, there have been issues with conflict of interest of the
commissioners and arbitrary decision-making in disciplining players.
This Comment explores the disciplinary systems of the four major U.S.
professional sports leagues to determine whether they currently preserve
justice. It then examines some of the most successful international sports
disputes systems as a comparison. To preserve the public’s faith in the
integrity of sport, this Comment proposes a new independent arbitral
body, the American Sports Arbitral Tribunal (ASAT), which would hear
the disciplinary appeals from these U.S. professional sports leagues, at
least removing the potential conflict of interest within the current systems.
Finally, this Comment concludes that the leagues and players’
associations would have to help create and incorporate this ASAT, but
likely will not because nearly all of the collective bargaining negotiations
involve mainly monetary distribution. Unfortunately, this may lead to the
public losing faith in these sports leagues.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Fairness, consistency, and flexibility: these traits are often associated
1
with the United States’ legal system, but are somehow missing from the
2
disciplinary systems of American professional sports leagues.
3
Numerous examples from the four major professional sports leagues in
the United States demonstrate the lack of these traits, and many of them
will be discussed in this Comment. While examples from the National
Football League (NFL), Major League Baseball (MLB), and National
Basketball Association (NBA) will be discussed in Part II, the National
Hockey League (NHL) provides several recent examples that will be
discussed first as an illustration of some common problems with these
4
disciplinary systems.
The 2012 NHL playoffs were the most violent in recent years, partly
5
due to the league office’s inconsistency in doling out discipline. For
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1. ARIC W. DUTELLE, ETHICS FOR THE PUBLIC SERVICE PROFESSIONAL 107 (2011); J.
SCOTT HARR ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 51 (5th
ed. 2012); ALBERT P. MELONE & ALLAN KARNES, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM:
PERSPECTIVES, POLITICS, PROCESSES, AND POLICIES 103 (2d ed. 2008); BETH WALSTONDUNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO LAW 11, 17, 82 (5th ed. 2009).
2. Matthew J. Parlow, Professional Sports League Commissioners’ Authority and
Collective Bargaining, 11 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 179, 202 (2010); David Sirotkin, Note,
Disciplining the Disciplinary Systems in Professional Sports: An Attempt to Fix the Arbitrary
and Overreaching Disciplinary Powers of Sports Commissioners, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 289, 289–92 (2009).
3. National Football League (NFL), National Basketball Association (NBA), Major
League Baseball (MLB), and National Hockey League (NHL).
4. At the time of this writing, the NHL season had been delayed by a collective
bargaining dispute that finally ended well into the month of January, taking up nearly half the
season. Ira Podell & Ronald Blum, Drop the Puck: NHL, Players Settle Labor Dispute,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 6, 2013, available at NEWSBANK, Rec. No.
95c2ee61e7864e6455367f9d43cab80d. In conducting its second lockout in a decade, the NHL
has once again limited its fan base and market power, after what appeared to be an upswing
in popularity stemming from the 2012 playoffs. See Jeff Laniado, NHL Playoffs 2012: 3
Reasons Hockey Is Popular Again in the US, BLEACHER REPORT (Apr. 19, 2012),
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1152971-2012-nhl-stanley-cup-playoffshow-hockey-hasonce-again-become-popular-in-the-us; Steve Silverman, 8 NHL Teams Who Could Face
Attendance Issues Due to the Lockout, BLEACHER REPORT (Jan. 14, 2013),
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1484307-8-nhl-teams-facing-a-big-attendance-issues-due-tothe-lockout. The lockout may have once again hindered the NHL from achieving the same
level of popularity and power as the NBA, MLB, and NFL. See Podell & Blum, supra; Kurt
Badenhausen, NHL Lockout Is Over, but Will the Fans Come Back?, FORBES (Jan. 7, 2013,
10:55 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2013/01/07/nhl-lockout-is-over-butwill-the-fans-come-back/. A brief view of the NHL’s structural history will be discussed in
Part II.D., infra.
5. Matt Brooks, NHL Playoffs: Carl Hagelin, Matt Carkner Suspensions Continue
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example, in a first round game, Ottawa Senator Matt Carkner dropped
his gloves and started punching New York Ranger Brian Boyle, who did
6
not drop his gloves, making him an “unwilling combatant.” Boyle
never threw a punch and was knocked to the ground, which typically
signifies the end of a fight as the referees traditionally step in to separate
the players, but Carkner kept punching and the referees did not get
7
involved. Carkner’s actions subjected him to a minor penalty, a major
8
penalty, and a game misconduct penalty. When the referees failed to
get involved, fellow Ranger Brandon Dubinsky was the first of
9
numerous players to intervene and separate the two. According to
NHL Rule 46.16, referees have discretion to impose a game misconduct
penalty on an intervening player; further, the game misconduct penalty
is supposed to be imposed on every additional player involved in the
10
same altercation during the same stoppage of play.
However, the
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League’s Inconsistent Rulings, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2012, 9:59 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/capitals-insider/post/nhl-playoffs-carl-hagelin-mattcarkner-suspensions-continue-leagues-inconsistentrulings/2012/04/16/gIQAzmROLT_blog.html.
6. NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE OFFICIAL RULES § 6, R. 46.2 (2012–2013) [hereinafter
NHL OFFICIAL RULES], available at http://www.nhl.com/nhl/en/v3/ext/pdfs/201213_RuleBook.pdf; Brooks, supra note 5.
7. ROSS BERNSTEIN, THE CODE: THE UNWRITTEN RULES OF FIGHTING AND
RETALIATION IN THE NHL 73 (2006); Senators’ Matt Carkner Suspended One Game for
Fighting, SPORTING NEWS, Apr. 15, 2012, http://www.sportingnews.com/nhl/story/2012-0415/2012-stanley-cup-playoffs-matt-carkner-brian-boyle-fight-rangers-senators (describing the
fight). Carkner had not played earlier in the series and the Rangers had dominated the
physical play to that point. See Dominik Jansky, Rangers Vs. Senators, Game 1: Rangers
Enjoy Spoils of Top Seed, SBNATION.COM (Apr. 13, 2012, 10:03 AM),
http://www.sbnation.com/nhl/2012/4/13/2945491/new-york-rangers-ottawa-senators-game-1nhl-playoffs-2012; Ira Podell, Rangers’ Carl Hagelin Suspended 3 Games, Senators’ Matt
Carkner Penalized 1 Game, NHL.COM, Apr. 15, 2012, http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=6
28081. It appeared that the Senators’ coach may have turned Carkner loose as a weapon to
take back momentum and try to win some games. See Podell, supra; Katie Strang, There Will
Be Blood . . . and Stitches: Rangers, Senators Understand that Game 2 Nastiness was Just the
Beginning, ESPNNEWYORK.COM (Apr. 15, 2012, 9:36 AM), http://espn.go.com/newyork/nhl/story/_/id/7815106/2012-stanley-cup-playoffs-new-york-rangers-ottawa-senatorsratchet-nastiness.
8. NHL OFFICIAL RULES, supra note 6, § 4; NHL Suspends Hagelin, Carkner,
FACEOFF.COM, Apr. 15, 2012, http://www.faceoff.com/suspends+Hagelin+Carkner/6463167/st
ory.html (listing the penalties Carkner received).
9. Arthur Staple, Boyle, Dubinsky Move on from Game 2 Sideshow, NEWSDAY (Apr.
15, 2012, 10:04 PM), http://www.newsday.com/sports/hockey/rangers/boyle-dubinsky-moveon-from-game-2-sideshow-1.3662877.
10. NHL OFFICIAL RULES, supra note 6, § 6, R. 46.16.
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referees only gave Dubinsky and Carkner game misconduct penalties.
Following the game, NHL Vice President of Player Safety, Brendan
Shanahan, suspended Carkner for one game, the same amount of time
Dubinsky would miss from his game misconduct, despite the fact that
Carkner was a repeat offender and Dubinsky was not, and despite the
12
vast difference in their penalties.
Later in the series, another Ranger, who had never been suspended
before, was suspended for three games after being penalized for
checking Senator’s captain Daniel Alfredsson into the boards, resulting
13
in a head injury that caused Alfredsson to leave the game. This came
just days after Shea Weber, the Nashville Predators’ captain, grabbed
Detroit Red Wing Henrik Zetterberg by the back of the head and
violently smashed his head into the boards near the end of the game;
14
Weber was fined only $2,500 and was not suspended.
The only recourse players have when disciplined by the league office
is an appeal to the NHL Commissioner, which most players find futile
15
because of the extremely limited success rate of appeals. While these
situations demonstrate the unfairness, inconsistency, and lack of
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11. Steve Zipay, Neil’s OT Goal Give Sens Win Over Rangers, NEWSDAY (Apr. 14, 2012,
11:48 PM), http://www.newsday.com/sports/hockey/rangers/neil-s-ot-goal-give-sens-win-overrangers-1.3661582.
12. Alex Arthur, Matter of Intent, KING ARTHUR’S COURT (Apr. 19, 2012),
http://www.tuftsdaily.com/mobile/sports/alex-arthur-king-arthur-s-court-1.2732388; JonRosen,
Dubinsky to Hear from NHL, L.A. KINGS INSIDER (Feb. 6, 2013 7:26 AM),
http://lakingsinsider.com/2013/02/06/dubinsky-to-hear-from-nhl/.
Carkner maliciously
attacked Boyle while Dubinsky stepped in to pull Carkner off of Boyle. Zipay, supra note 11.
The NHL also claims that being a repeat offender is taken into consideration when
determining a penalty. See infra Part III.D.
13. Damien Cox, NHL Playoffs Veer Wildly out of Control, THE STAR (Apr. 15, 2012),
http://www.thestar.com/sports/hockey/2012/04/15/cox_nhl_playoffs_veer_wildly_out_of_contr
ol.html.
14. Robert MacLeod, Suspensions Have Ruled the NHL Playoffs, The GLOBE AND
MAIL (June 18, 2012, 10:24 AM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/sports/hockey/suspensions
-have-ruled-the-nhl-playoffs/article4204229/. Weber then signed a fourteen-year $110 million
contract over the off-season. Brian Stubits, Predators Match Shea Weber Offer Sheet, Keep
Captain in Nashville, CBS SPORTS (July 24, 2012, 3:13 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/nhl/blo
g/eye-on-hockey/19647711/predators-match-shea-weber-offer-sheet-keep-captain-innashville. Doing the math, his annual salary is now $7.85 million, which makes this fine about
0.03% of his annual salary and only 2.6% of his salary per game. Considering the aggressive
nature of the act and the other punishments handed out for less egregious conduct, this fine is
an example of why many do not take NHL discipline seriously.
15. See Matthew Heimlich, Why the NHL Needs an Independent Disciplinary Appeals
System, SPORTS LAW 101 (Dec. 21, 2011, 1:19 PM), http://www.sportslaw101.com/2011/12/21/
why-the-nhl-needs-an-independent-disciplinary-appeals-system/.
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See infra Part II.A–C.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.

03/17/2014 11:30:34

16.
17.
18.
19.

34609-mqt_97-2 Sheet No. 134 Side B

flexibility in the NHL disciplinary process, such circumstances are not
confined merely to the NHL; they often occur in the other three major
16
American professional sports leagues.
It is because of this unfairness, inconsistency, and inflexibility that
this Comment proposes the creation of an American Sports Arbitration
Tribunal (ASAT), which would be responsible for arbitrating the
17
appeals to disciplinary actions of the participating professional leagues.
This independent tribunal would provide American professional sports
leagues with a truly neutral body to hear disciplinary appeals. The
ASAT would make the appeals procedure more fair and mitigate the
problems of the current systems, such as having the commissioner act as
18
Additionally, this Comment
the judge, jury, and executioner.
recommends that the American professional sports leagues provide a
detailed outline of what conduct will result in suspension and utilize a
19
system where punishments are based on precedent.
Part II of this Comment will examine the history of the disciplinary
process in American professional sports leagues and the role the
commissioners have played in determining whether the commissioner
system is fair. Part III will discuss the current disciplinary processes of
the leagues under their governing documents to fully explore the
opportunities for appeal and analyze their effectiveness. Part IV will
look at other effective systems of sports discipline around the world,
specifically the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), the Basketball
Arbitral Tribunal (BAT), and the National Rugby League’s (NRL)
system in Australia, to provide some examples of successful structures
that do not use a commissioner as the ultimate authority and determine
the applicable and inapplicable aspects of these systems to the American
professional sports leagues. Part V will briefly analyze the United States
legal system’s judicial review to put the American legal standard in
context. Part VI will introduce the ASAT and suggest how it could be
incorporated into the American professional sports systems by
incorporating different facets from the American leagues’ CBAs and
those of the global systems analyzed in Part IV. Part VII will conclude
with additional recommendations to make professional sports discipline

C M
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more effective and consider the likelihood that the ASAT would be
implemented.
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSIONER POWER IN THE DISCIPLINARY
PROCESS
Since the early twentieth century, American sports leagues have
recognized the need for strong central leadership to enforce the rules,
discipline the players, and maintain public interest and integrity of the
20
game.
The team owners of the four major American professional
sports leagues (NFL, MLB, NBA, and NHL) created this central
authority in the position of the commissioner, giving the ultimate power
21
of the entire league to one person. While commissioners have been
22
instrumental in these leagues’ success, they have not been perfect. By
examining the history of the commissioner system in the four major
American professional sports leagues, the need for an independent
tribunal to settle disputes becomes apparent.
A. Beginnings of the Commissioner in the MLB
Various situations from the MLB’s history provide examples of the
23
flaws of the commissioner system. As America’s oldest sports league,
the MLB has long experienced the inherent unfairness, inconsistency,

03/17/2014 11:30:34
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20. Parlow, supra note 2, at 181–83.
21. Id. at 185–87.
22. See Matthew B. Pachman, Note, Limits on the Discretionary Powers of Professional
Sports Commissioners: A Historical and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by the Pete Rose
Controversy, 76 VA. L. REV. 1409, 1413–18 (1990) (describing several issues with the MLB
Commissioner’s “nearly unbridled power”); see also Sirotkin, supra note 2, at 306–09
(describing several disciplinary proceedings where there was a dispute regarding
commissioner’s power). The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) pointed out in 1969
that the internal dispute system was flawed because the commissioner was appointed by the
owners and would seemingly rule in their favor. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 180
N.L.R.B. 190, 191 (1969). The NLRB stated, “The system appears to have been designed
almost entirely by employers and owners, and the final arbiter of internal disputes does not
appear to be a neutral third party freely chosen by both sides, but rather an individual
appointed solely by the member club owners themselves.” Id. (referring to Major League
Baseball’s arbitration system). However, this dispute occurred before the players association
began collectively bargaining with the league, which removed the disputes from the NLRB’s
jurisdiction because disputes became governed by collective bargaining agreements. See
MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS 436 (2d ed. 2009).
23. See, e.g., Ken Belson, Baseball Fires the Arbitrator Who Overturned Braun’s 50Game Suspension, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2012, at B15.
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24

and inflexibility that the commissioner structure creates.
Recent
arbitration cases over the use of performance-enhancing drugs are
prime examples of the flaws in the current commissioner system.
The MLB was the first professional sports league to create a
25
“Commissioner” office. In 1919, the baseball world was rocked by a
massive scandal when the infamous Chicago “Black Sox” supposedly
26
accepted bribes to fix the World Series.
Worried about fans’
perception, the owners sought to create a position that would protect
the integrity of the game and nominated United States District Judge
27
Kenesaw Mountain Landis for the position. Landis took the position
on the condition that he was granted broad authority to discipline
28
After letting the legal
players in “the best interest of the game.”
process play out, Landis suspended the eight implicated players for life
29
even though they were found not guilty. This decision established the
MLB’s right to discipline its athletes independent of the legal system
and serves as precedent for enhanced commissioner’s authority under
the best interests clauses in later Collective Bargaining Agreements
30
(CBAs).
Commissioner Landis used his broad power to punish anyone he
31
believed deserved it. For example, a player was arrested for stealing a
car and receiving stolen cars in 1920 and instead of waiting for the
32
criminal trial to finish, Landis suspended the player during the case.
After the player was acquitted he applied for reinstatement, but Landis
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24. The current disciplinary system is laid out in the 2012–2016 CBA agreement between
the players association and the owners that is discussed infra Part III.A.
25. Parlow, supra note 2, at 183.
26. Mark T. Gould, In Whose “Best Interests”?: The Narrowing Role of Baseball’s
Commissioner, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Spring 1994, at 1, 19.
27. Id.
28. Adam Epstein, An Exploration of Interesting Clauses in Sports, 21 J. LEGAL
ASPECTS SPORT 5, 12 (2011). Even the selection of Landis as commissioner can be viewed
skeptically because he was the judge that ruled in favor of Major League Baseball (then
Organized Baseball) when it was sued in an antitrust case by Federal Baseball. Jason M.
Pollack, Take My Arbitrator, Please: Commissioner “Best Interests” Disciplinary Authority in
Professional Sports, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1645, 1650 (1999).
29. Pollack, supra note 28, at 1652. Landis likely chose this course of action to counter
the seemingly unfair trial where the players’ confessions “mysteriously disappeared” and the
jurors carried the players out of the courtroom on their shoulders in celebration. Id.
30. Id. at 1653–54.
31. See id. at 1653–56 (noting Commissioner Landis’s use of broad authority during the
1920s).
32. Id. at 1654.
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determined the player should have been found guilty and suspended the
33
player for life. In the only case to challenge his unfettered authority,
an Illinois district court affirmed the Commissioner’s power when it held
that Landis’s decisions were absolute and binding because the owners
34
intended to give him such power. As the first commissioner, Landis
shaped the nature of the position and established a precedent for his
35
future successors to do nearly anything they would want.
The next major event that changed the scope of disciplinary
authority occurred in 1970 when the head of the MLB Players
Association (MLBPA) successfully bargained for an independent
36
arbitrator to handle labor disputes and conflicts arising from the CBA.
Then-Commissioner Bowie Kuhn maintained the authority to handle
issues that only involved the integrity of the game or the public’s faith in
37
baseball. The independent arbitrator was first utilized during the 1970
season when the California Angels attempted to suspend an outfielder
38
for “lackadaisical play.”
The arbitrator overturned the suspension
after finding that the player was “emotionally ill and belonged on the
39
disabled list.”
In 1989, Commissioner A. Bartlett Giamatti regained some of the
position’s power when he banned Pete Rose from baseball for life for
betting on baseball games in which he was the manager of one of the
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33. Id. at 1654–55. Then in 1921, Landis suspended Babe Ruth and any New York
Yankee that “barnstormed” after winning the World Series. Id. at 1655–56. Barnstorming
involves players touring the country and playing pick-up games against non-professional
teams for money. See id. at 1655 n.76; History of Barnstorming, BARNSTORMERSBASEBALL.
COM, http://www.barnstormersbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i
d=636&Itemid=191 (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
34. See Milwaukee Am. Ass’n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 302 (N.D. Ill. 1931) (holding that
“it was the intent of the parties to make the commissioner an arbiter, whose decisions made in
good faith, upon evidence, upon all questions relating to the purpose of the organization and
all conduct detrimental thereto, should be absolutely binding”).
35. See Pollack, supra note 28, at 1658.
36. Id. at 1662–63.
37. Id. at 1662.
38. Id. at 1663.
39. Id. Commissioner Kuhn’s power took another big hit when he attempted to suspend
Texas Ranger player Ferguson Jenkins after Jenkins was arrested in an airport for possession
of two ounces of marijuana, two grams of hashish, and four grams of cocaine. Id. at 1668.
When the union filed a grievance, the arbitrator found that the suspension was the result of
“mere surmise,” and Jenkins escaped suspension, despite the fact he was convicted. Id. at
1668–69. Then in 1984, a pitcher was arrested in the Dominican Republic for possession of
cocaine; after the Commissioner suspended him the MLBPA filed a grievance, but the
arbitrator overturned the suspension. Id. at 1669.
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40

teams. One reason for the intensity of the suspension was because
Rose did not admit to gambling; in fact, he fought the accusation for
41
fourteen years before finally coming clean. Initially, Rose challenged
Commissioner Giamatti’s conduct in investigating Rose’s illegal
gambling activities, but the Ohio district court held that Commissioner
42
Giamatti was well within the authority granted to him by the CBA.
While this was a move towards more deference to the commissioner’s
discretion, Rose was disciplined as a manager, not as a player; thus, he
did not have the benefit of the MLBPA or a CBA to fight the
43
suspension.
44
After the recreational drug issues in the 1980s, the next major issue
to shape the commissioner’s ability to discipline players arose at the turn
of the twenty-first century in the midst of what is now referred to as “the
45
Steroid Era.” The MLB instituted a drug testing policy in 2005 and
created a five-strike suspension test that started at ten days for the first
46
offense. When evidence came out that the steroid problem was bigger
than he thought, Commissioner Bud Selig created a new disciplinary
system for performance-enhancing drugs: fifty games for the first
positive test, one hundred games for the second, and a lifetime ban for
47
the third. This policy imposes a strict liability standard using zero
tolerance that does not take into account any circumstances of particular
48
situations.
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40. Matthew A. Foote, Three Strikes and You’re (Not Necessarily) Out: How Baseball’s
Erratic Approach to Conduct Violations Is Not in the Best Interest of the Game, 6 DEPAUL J.
SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 13 (2009).
41. Id. at 14.
42. Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F. Supp. 906, 918–19 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
43. See Foote, supra note 40, at 15.
44. See id. at 17–25. See generally Ed Magnuson, Baseball’s Drug Scandal, TIME, Sept.
16, 1985, at 26 (discussing drug abuse by MLB players in the 1980s).
45. See Foote, supra note 40, at 25–29.
46. Steroid Suspensions, BASEBALL ALMANAC, http://www.baseballalmanac.com/legendary/steroids_baseball.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
47. Jonathan Bass, Bud Selig’s Tenure as MLB Commissioner Takes Path Similar to
Recovering Addict, GAMEDAYR (Aug. 21, 2013, 2:54 PM), http://gamedayr.com/sports/budselig-mlb-commissioner-tenure-recovering-addict/; Steroid Suspensions, supra note 46. This
disciplinary system for performance-enhancing drugs remains in use.
48. Foote, supra note 40, at 31–32. This is going to be even more applicable if the MLB
decides to create harsher penalties for violating the Joint Drug Agreement because of the
extent of the Biogenesis scandal. See Richard Justice, Majority of Players Want Tougher
PED Penalties, MLB.COM (Feb. 26, 2013, 12:05 PM), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ym
d=20130226&content_id=42006512&vkey=news_mlb&c_id=mlb (noting that players are
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The unfairness of such a standard was well illustrated when former
Philadelphia Phillies pitcher J.C. Romero was suspended for testing
positive for a performance-enhancing drug before a World Series
49
game. The positive test resulted from a banned ingredient found in a
supplement he had purchased from a local General Nutrition Store
(GNC) that was mislabeled to show that it did not include the banned
50
Romero took the supplement after the MLBPA had
ingredient.
circulated a memo that said any supplements purchasable at GNC were
51
approved. Moreover, the League suspended Romero despite the fact
he had checked with two nutritionists and his strength and conditioning
52
coach to confirm the supplement was approved. Romero served a fifty
game suspension after he refused the MLB’s offer of a twenty-five game
53
suspension if he would admit guilt.
One of the least fair aspects of the appeal system in the MLB is the
fact that the league can fire an “independent” arbitrator at any time,
without cause, and has recently done so with an arbitrator that ruled
54
against it. In February 2012, Ryan Braun became the first player to
successfully appeal a performance-enhancing drug related suspension in
55
arbitration against the league.
Braun was able to win the appeal
despite not challenging the science of the test or proving tampering, but
56
simply by arguing a procedural error. While the hearing was held
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pushing for harsher penalties in light of the Biogenesis scandal); Ron Matejko, Bud Selig:
Stricter Drug Penalties, ESPNDALLAS.COM (Mar. 2, 2013, 7:23 PM), http://espn.go.com/mlb/s
pring2013/story/_/id/9008032/bud-selig-calls-tougher-drug-penalties-violations (explaining
that Commissioner Selig is pushing for harsher penalties); MLB Suspends 13, Including ARod, ESPN.COM (Aug. 6, 2013, 12:06 PM), http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/9540755/mlbbans-13-including-alex-rodriguez-new-york-yankees-2014 (detailing the extent of the
Biogenesis scandal).
49. Foote, supra note 40, at 31.
50. Id. at 31–32. Romero did not name the particular supplement he used from GNC.
Peter Gammons, Suspended Romero ‘Didn’t Cheat,’ ESPN.COM (Jan. 6, 2009, 1:36 PM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3812334.
51. Foote, supra note 40, at 31.
52. Id.
53. Gammons, supra note 50. Luckily, the appeal took place during the World Series
and Romero was permitted to pitch. Id.
54. 30 MAJOR LEAGUE CLUBS & MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASS’N., 2012–
2016 BASIC AGREEMENT art. XI, § A(9) (2011) [hereinafter MLB CBA], available at
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf; Belson, supra note 23.
55. Ken Belson & Michael S. Schmidt, Star Player First to Win Appeal on a Drug Test,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2012, at A1.
56. Id.; see also Jeré Longman, A Flawed Policy for Drug Testing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26,
2012, at SP9. Braun’s representatives publicly denigrated the man who collected Braun’s
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57

before an “independent” arbitration tribunal, the lead arbitrator, who
had served as the independent arbitrator for longer than any of his
predecessors, was fired by MLB three months after he ruled against the
58
league. This situation shows that the appeals process may not actually
59
be impartial.
Not only can either party fire an arbitrator, but each party can select
an arbitrator, who is not required to be impartial, to sit on the panel
60
with a single impartial arbitrator responsible for making the decision.
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sample, calling his actions “inappropriate.” Ronald Blum, David Cornwell, Ryan Braun’s
Lawyer, Criticizes Drug Collector Dino Laurenzi Jr., HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 1, 2012, 6:56
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/01/david-cornwell-ryan-braun-dino-laurenzi_n_
1315064.html. Braun would later agree to a sixty-five-game suspension for violation of the
Joint Drug Agreement and publicly “apologize.” Erik Brady, Brewers’ Ryan Braun
Suspended for Rest of Season, USA TODAY (July 22, 2013, 11:51 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/brewers/2013/07/22/ryan-braun-suspendedmilwaukee-season/2576215/. He finally admitted to using performance-enhancing drugs in a
scripted statement he and his representatives sent out to the media in late August 2013. Ryan
Braun’s Full Statement, ESPN.COM (Aug. 22, 2013, 8:01 PM), http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/i
d/9592973/ryan-braun-full-statement-admitting-ped-use.
57. Belson, supra note 23. The MLB uses a three-person arbitration panel for these
disputes; composed of two-party arbitrators, one chosen by the league and one by the players’
association, and one independent arbitrator appointed by the agreement of both. MLB CBA,
supra note 54, at art. XI, § A(9).
58. Belson, supra note 23. The arbitrator had served for thirteen years arbitrating cases
between the union and the league. Id. His ruling provided precedent for other players in
similar situations to escape suspension based on procedural errors, though the league and
union are revising the language of the policy to eliminate any ambiguity and make the system
stricter and more difficult to appeal. Id.
59. According to the CBA, either the league or the players association can terminate
any arbitrator for any reason, as long as that arbitrator is not currently hearing a case. MLB
CBA, supra note 54, at art. XI, § A(9). The American Arbitration Association (AAA)
submits a list of arbitrators to serve as MLB arbitrators, and when the Players Association
and League cannot agree on the impartial arbitrator for a case, they narrow the list by striking
names until only one remains and he or she is the arbitrator for that hearing. Id.
60. See Longman, supra note 56; see also MLB CBA, supra note 54, at art. XI, § A(9);
Belson & Schmidt, supra note 55. This system will be tested soon when Alex Rodriguez and
his legal team bring their appeal to his 211-game suspension, the largest suspension ever. Ted
Keith, A - R o d S u s p e n d e d T h r o u g h 2 0 1 4 , Wi l l A p p e a l ; 1 2 O t h e r s G i v e n L e s s e r
B a n s , MLBSI.COM (Aug. 5, 2013), http://mlb.si.com/2013/08/05/a-rod-suspended-through2014-will-appeal-12-others-given-lesser-bans/; Travis Waldron, The List of Baseball Players
Suspended in the Biogenesis Scandal, THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 5, 2013, 1:45 PM),
http://thinkprogress.org/sports/2013/08/05/2414251/the-list-of-baseball-players-suspended-inthe-biogenesis-scandal/. Rodriguez was one of fourteen players suspended, but was the only
one to file a formal appeal and will likely argue that he is being treated arbitrarily. Barry
Petchesky, The Full List of Suspended Biogenesis Clients, DEADSPIN (Aug. 5, 2013, 12:46
PM), http://deadspin.com/the-full-list-of-suspended-biogenesis-clients-1029648603; Tom Van
Riper, Baseball Dishes Out Biogenesis Suspensions—Don’t Expect Much Damage, FORBES
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While the “independent” arbitrator ruled in this case, the fact that he
was fired shows that the ultimate authority may still lie with the
61
commissioner.
The initial authority granted to the MLB Commissioner gave him so
much power that he could discipline a player who was found not guilty
62
of charges. This is unfair because the disciplinary system, much like
U.S. societal and legal norms, is supposed to presume the innocence of
63
the accused until proven guilty. Though the commissioner’s power has
undergone changes based on independent arbitration, the League now
has the ability to fire arbitrators, which gives an arbitrator an incentive
64
to rule in favor of the League in order to retain employment. The
League has also shown inflexibility in its handling of drug violations,
leaving the players completely responsible for league, team, and
65
manufacturer negligence. These are among the issues that illustrate
the need for a new appeal system in the MLB.
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(Aug. 5, 2013, 3:06 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomvanriper/2013/08/05/baseball-dishesout-biogenesis-suspensions-I-expect-much-damage/.
61. Since the League is more frequently involved in arbitration than the association
(because the player can elect union representation but is not required to use it), the
“impartial” arbitrators have an incentive to not make a decision against the League office.
See HON. MING W. CHIN ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: EMPLOYMENT
LITIGATION 18:665 (2012); MLB CBA, supra note 54, at art. XI, § A(9). The system
explained in the CBA prevents an arbitrator from making an obvious arbitrary or capricious
decision, which is already generally prohibited by the laws regarding arbitration. MLB CBA,
supra note 54, at art. XI, § A(9); CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL 462 (2d ed. 2011) (citing Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1925)). The MLB’s arbitration procedure provides no
additional protection of impartiality, and in fact gives reason to believe the arbitrators would
not be impartial. See supra notes 54–60 and accompanying text.
62. Pollack, supra note 28, at 1654–55.
63. See Coffin v. U.S., 156 U.S. 432, 458–60 (1895); PATRICK K. THORNTON ET AL.,
SPORTS ETHICS FOR SPORTS MANAGEMENT PROFESSIONALS 433 (2012); Parlow, supra note
2, at 201.
64. Belson, supra note 23. This pressure on the arbitrator to rule for the League
illustrates the unfairness of the arbitration system.
65. See Christian Red, J.C. Romero, Former Phillies Reliever Suspended for Performance
Enhancing Drugs, Settles Lawsuit, Says ‘Justice Is Served’ After Supplement is Tainted, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (Jan. 10, 2012, 3:24 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/i-team/romerophillies-reliever-suspended-performance-enhancing-drugs-settles-lawsuit-justice-servedsupplement-tainted-article-1.1003730 (explaining that J.C. Romero was suspended for fifty
games after an over-the-counter supplement he was taking was later found to contain banned
substances). No system of strict liability should exist in the sports world. See infra Part V. At
the very least, players like Romero should be rewarded with the benefit of the doubt when
they go through the effort to double-check with their teams or the League to make sure a
substance is legal and are clearly not at fault. See infra Part V. The lack of any room for

34609-mqt_97-2 Sheet No. 138 Side B

03/17/2014 11:30:34

ABRAMS-10 (DO NOT DELETE)

482

3/10/2014 12:33 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[97:2

B. History and Issues with the NFL’s Commissioner
While the current system of NFL discipline and appeals is likely the
most flexible of the major American professional sports leagues, it is still
fraught with unfairness and inconsistency. The current commissioner,
Roger Goodell, has imposed a nearly dictatorial rule: he has the right to
both hand out discipline, directly or indirectly, and rule on the appeal
66
thereof. As the League has evolved, so has the commissioner’s power;
it has grown to such a level that problems are becoming more evident
67
and there is a dire need to alter the system.
The owners first granted significant authority to Commissioner Pete
Rozelle, the third man to hold the position, partially because he was
68
able to bring financial solvency to the League. NFL owners granted
Rozelle similar authority to MLB Commissioner Landis, but unlike the
MLB, the NFL did not have an arbitration procedure in the CBA for
69
discipline. Rozelle attempted to institute a drug-testing policy in the
NFL but the NFL Players Association (NFLPA) would not agree to it,
and an arbitrator ruled that instituting the testing policy was beyond the
70
commissioner’s power under the CBA. In 2000, Commissioner Paul
Tagliabue was empowered to suspend players for off-the-field conduct
71
While
under the League’s first Personal Conduct Policy (PCP).
Tagliabue gradually increased the power and authority of his position,
72
his power is dwarfed in comparison to his successor, Roger Goodell.
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error by anyone involved and only disciplining the player shows the flaws with the current
system. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text.
66. Joshua A. Reece, Note, Throwing the Red Flag on the Commissioner: How
Independent Arbitrators Can Fit into the NFL’s Off-Field Discipline Procedures Under the
NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 359, 360 (2010).
67. See, e.g., Jarrett Bell, Bounty Ruling Proves Goodell Was Sloppy, USA TODAY
(Dec. 12, 2012, 3:52 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2012/12/11/chicago-bellpaul-tagliabue-roger-goodell-bounty-scandal-was-just-a-witch-hunt/1762007/.
68. Parlow, supra note 2, at 187.
69. Id.; Robert I. Lockwood, Comment, The Best Interests of the League: Referee Betting
Scandal Brings Commissioner Authority and Collective Bargaining Back to the Frontcourt in
the NBA, 15 SPORTS LAW. J. 137, 146–47 (2008).
70. Colin J. Daniels & Aaron Brooks, From the Black Sox to the Sky Box: The Evolution
and Mechanics of Commissioner Authority, 10 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 23, 32 (2008).
71. Marc Edelman, Are Commissioner Suspensions Really Any Different From Illegal
Group Boycotts? Analyzing Whether the NFL Personal Conduct Policy Illegally Restrains
Trade, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 631, 636–37 (2009).
72. Id. Under the most recent CBA, the commissioner has the authority to name the
officer to hear a discipline appeal and can elect to hear it himself at his discretion. NAT’L
FOOTBALL LEAGUE & NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS’N., COLLECTIVE
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In August 2006, the owners elected Roger Goodell to serve as
73
commissioner.
Soon after accepting this position, Goodell
strengthened the PCP by making it stricter and applying it to a broader
74
range of conduct. The PCP is not part of the CBA, so any discipline
75
that arises from it is not subject to the CBA’s arbitration provision.
Instead, under the CBA, the commissioner, through himself or an
76
appointee, is the appellate body for all player discipline grievances.
Goodell has used his authority under the PCP to suspend numerous
athletes without giving them an opportunity to seek an appeal from an
77
While the PCP contains a limited list of
independent arbitrator.
conduct that may lead to discipline, the list is vague and can be
78
interpreted as broadly as the commissioner wishes. Moreover, it does
not contain an outline of potential disciplinary sanctions, but instead
79
states that discipline will be handed down “as warranted.” This clause
creates suspicion of potential arbitrariness of discipline under the PCP
80
because it makes the commissioner “the judge, jury and executioner.”
This power demonstrates the unfairness in the system because the
commissioner has no check on his authority and the governing
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BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. 46, § 2(a) (2011) [hereinafter NFL CBA], available at
http://images.nflplayers.com/mediaResources/files/PDFs/General/2011_Final_CBA.pdf.
73. Robert Ambrose, Note, The NFL Makes It Rain: Through Strict Enforcement of Its
Conduct Policy, the NFL Protects Its Integrity, Wealth, and Popularity, 34 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1069, 1087 (2008).
74. Edelman, supra note 71, at 637.
75. Id. at 638.
76. NFL CBA, supra note 72, at art. 46; Casinova O. Henderson, How Much Discretion
Is Too Much for the NFL Commissioner to Have Over the Players Off-the-Field Conduct?, 17
SPORTS LAW. J. 167, 170–71 (2010); Sirotkin, supra note 2, at 300.
77. Sirotkin, supra note 2, at 301 (providing several examples of Commissioner Goodell
handing out discipline).
78. Logan O’Shaughnessy, After Review: An Open Letter to NFL Commissioner Roger
Goodell Suggesting That Limiting the League’s Disciplinary Power Under the Personal
Conduct Policy May Be in the League’s Best Interests, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 527, 534–35
(2011) (citing NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY (2008), available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20101228103442/http://images.nflplayers.com/mediaResources/im
ages/oldImages/fck/NFL%20Personal%20Conduct%20Policy%202008.pdf
(accessed
by
entering URL in the Internet Archive index)); see also NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE,
PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY (2012) [hereinafter
NFL
PCP], available
at
http://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/personal-conduct-policy.pdf.
79. O’Shaughnessy, supra note 78, at 535–36.
80. Id. at 536; Michael McCann, Overturning of Bounty Suspensions Backs Goodell into
a Corner, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 7, 2012, 6:46 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/201
2/writers/michael_mccann/09/07/saints-suspensions-overturned/index.html.
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documents do not provide specific guidelines for conduct that may be
81
disciplined, or the punishments to be imposed.
Questions of subjective arbitrariness also arise regarding the player
discipline system because similar situations have not been treated
82
consistently. For instance, a player was arrested for DUI after he hit a
parked car and then failed a breathalyzer test; the League fined him
83
under the Substance Abuse Policy.
One year earlier, the League
suspended another player for three games under the PCP after he was
84
arrested on suspicion of drunk driving, but did not get in an accident.
Another example that creates questions about the objectivity and
consistency of the commissioner is the suspension of New Orleans
85
Saints’ head coach, Sean Payton. Goodell suspended Payton for a year
for not stopping a “cash-for-hits” pool that the Saints operated—where
players received monetary payments for big hits, injuring opposing
86
players, and making impactful plays—dubbed “Bounty-Gate.”
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81. See generally infra Part III.B (discussing the governing NFL documents).
82. O’Shaughnessy, supra note 78, at 537.
83. Id. at 537–39. Cincinnati Bengals’ linebacker Rey Maualuga registered a 0.157 blood
alcohol content when police issued the breathalyzer. Id. at 537–38; Ray Slover, Bengals’ Rey
Maualuga Fined; Suspension Revoked, SPORTNINGNEWS NFL (Aug. 17, 2010, 10:39 PM),
http://www.sportingnews.com/nfl/story/2010-08-17/bengals-rey-maualuga-fined-suspensionrevoked. He received a suspended-seven day jail sentence, his license was suspended for
ninety days, and he did not help the circumstances by having an underage girl in the car. Id.
84. O’Shaughnessy, supra note 78, at 539. During the 2013 summer, Goodell did not
punish Eagles’ wide receiver Riley Cooper for publicly using a racial slur in a video-taped
rant at a concert. Sam Farmer, Roger Goodell: Team Punishment of Riley Cooper Is Enough,
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsnow/la-sp-sn-cooper-goodell20130801,0,3229785.story#axzz2cdh18U7E. Goodell cited the CBA policy that the League
does not punish a player for the same incident if he has already been punished by his team.
Id. He also deflected a comparison of the slur Cooper used to the name Redskins, which has
come under criticism of no longer being acceptable. Id. The League has also come under
much public disparagement for its seemingly arbitrary policing of fineable hits. See Jeff
Dickerson, Jon Bostic Fined $21K for Hit, ESPNCHICAGO.COM (Aug. 21, 2013, 4:20 PM),
http://espn.go.com/chicago/nfl/story/_/id/9587983/jon-bostic-chicago-bears-fined-21000-hitmike-willie-san-diego-chargers.
85. See Chris Smith, Roger Goodell Is Not Serious About Player Safety, and It’s Because
of Money, FORBES (Mar. 22, 2012, 11:41 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2012/03
/22/roger-goodell-nfl-are-not-serious-about-player-safety-and-its-because-of-money/.
86. Appeal Seeks Roger Goodell Recusal, ESPN.COM (Oct. 12, 2012, 8:03 PM),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/8493998/bounty-scandal-jonathan-vilma-others-appeal-seeksroger-goodell-recusal-sources-say; What Does Bounty-Gate Mean?, SPORTINGCHARTS.COM,
http://www.sportingcharts.com/dictionary/nfl/bounty-gate.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
The last person to receive a full-year suspension was Donte Stallworth, who killed a person in
a drunk-driving accident. Smith, supra note 85.
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Commissioner Goodell also fined the Saints organization a half-million
dollars and usurped the organization’s second-round draft pick for the
87
next two NFL Drafts. This was the most significant scandal since the
New England Patriots and coach Bill Belichick were found to have
88
videotaped opposing teams’ practices.
In response to the Patriots’
actions, Goodell fined the Patriots a quarter-million dollars, seized one
first-round draft pick, and fined Belichick a half-million dollars, but did
89
not suspend him. The League also claimed it destroyed the videotape
evidence and originally refused to release the number of tapes or what
90
they contained.
While Belichick explicitly broke an NFL rule and Payton condoned
a system that nearly every team around the League operates to some
91
extent, Belichick merely received a fine, which equates to about twelve
percent of his 2007 salary, and Payton was suspended without pay for a
year, equivalent to the nearly seven million dollars he would have made,
and lost the opportunity to coach a team that had been a perennial
92
championship contender. This marked an unprecedented increase in
punishment and illustrates the inconsistency of Commissioner Goodell’s
punishments. If the NFL had a more detailed governing document
explaining the illegal conduct, players and coaches would know what
conduct to avoid. There would be fewer appeals if this document had
explicit punishments for these actions. Further, if the appeals that
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87. Id. Additionally, the defensive coordinator said to have run the system was
suspended indefinitely, the general manager was suspended for half of the season, and an
assistant coach was suspended for six games. Roundup: All Bountygate Penalties Against
Saints, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 2, 2012, http://www.stltoday.com/roundup-allbountygate-penalties-against-saints/article_ab7bd2c6-948b-11e1-89ce-0019bb30f31a.html.
88. Judy Battista, Patriots Were Questioned on Videotaping Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2,
2008, at D2.
89. Id.; Greg Bishop, Questions Linger About Why N.F.L. Destroyed Patriots’ Tapes,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, at SP1; Belichick Draws $500,000 Fine, but Avoids Suspension,
ESPN.COM (Sep. 14, 2007, 10:16 AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3018338.
90. Battista, supra note 88; Bishop, supra note 89. In response to Senator Arlen
Specter’s public demand, it has come out that the League received eight tapes, recording
play-calling from five teams in six games. Timeline of Events Surrounding Patriots’
Videotaping Scandal, NFL.COM (July 26, 2012, 8:21 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0900
0d5d8084899e/article/timeline-of-events-surrounding-patriots-videotaping-scandal.
91. Smith, supra note 85.
92. Kristi Dosh, Bill Belichick Highest-Paid Coach—Again, ESPN.COM (May 16, 2012,
5:28 PM), http://espn.go.com/blog/playbook/dollars/post/_/id/719/bill-belichick-highest-paidcoach-again; Smith, supra note 85; Belichick Draws $500,000 Fine, but Avoids Suspension,
supra note 89.
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resulted from disciplinary action were heard by an independent tribunal,
then it could use a system of precedent and make sure the punishments
are consistent. Such a system may have prevented the debacle that
occurred from the suspensions of players involved in the scandal.
In addition to the discipline against the Saints organization and the
coaches for Bounty-Gate, Commissioner Goodell suspended four Saints
players accused of being the ring leaders of, and participating in, the
93
bounty pool. The players filed a grievance under the CBA claiming
94
that Goodell had abused his power in suspending them. Under the
CBA, this type of grievance is heard by a three-member panel of
95
arbitrators. Not only did the players appeal the suspensions, but one
96
also sued Goodell for defamation. An independent arbitration panel
overturned the suspensions and mandated that Goodell could only
reissue the suspensions if he found “there was intent to injure beyond
97
creating incentives for performance.” Goodell promptly reissued two
98
of the suspensions and adjusted the remaining two. When the players
appealed that decision, Goodell announced that his predecessor as
Commissioner, Paul Tagliabue, a lawyer, would hear the appeals instead
99
of Goodell.
Tagliabue then issued a decision that vacated the players’
100
He
suspensions but defended Commissioner Goodell’s findings.
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93. Appeal Seeks Roger Goodell Recusal, supra note 86. Defensive lineman Anthony
Hargrove was originally suspended for eight games; outside linebacker Scott Fujita was
suspended for three games; defensive end Will Smith was suspended for four games; and
middle linebacker Jonathan Vilma was suspended for an entire season. Roundup: All
Bountygate Penalties Against Saints, supra note 87.
94. See McCann, supra note 80; Appeal Seeks Roger Goodell Recusal, supra note 86.
95. McCann, supra note 80; Appeal Seeks Roger Goodell Recusal, supra note 86.
96. Appeal Seeks Roger Goodell Recusal, supra note 86; see also Vilma v. Goodell, 917 F.
Supp. 2d 591 (E.D. La. 2013). A judge dismissed the suit according to a rule that prevents
players from suing the commissioner for discipline resulting from a collective bargaining
agreement’s arbitration proceeding. Id. at 595–96; Jonathan Stempel, Judge Throws Out
Defamation Case Against NFL Commissioner, REUTERS (Jan. 17, 2013, 7:40 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/18/us-nfl-vilma-lawsuit-idUSBRE90H00W20130118.
97. McCann, supra note 80.
98. Appeal Seeks Roger Goodell Recusal, supra note 86.
99. Judy Battista, Tagliabue to Hear Appeals in Bounty Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2012,
at D6. By doing so, the Commissioner implicitly acknowledged that a conflict of interest
existed and the system is inherently unfair.
100. Will Brinson, Paul Tagliabue ‘Vacates All Player Discipline’ in Saints Bounty Case,
CBSSPORTS.COM (Dec. 11, 2012, 1:20 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/blog/eye-onfootball/21362069/paul-tagliabue-vacates-all-player-discipline-in-saints-bounty-case.
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believed that the process of acquiring facts and enforcing discipline
should have taken weeks, but the league office was misled by members
of the Saints organization, which caused it to take more than three
101
Tagliabue also determined that the players’ suspensions were
years.
unwarranted because they were grossly disproportionate to the
102
precedential punishment for similar actions.
While the exCommissioner found that the players’ conduct was detrimental to the
game, he vacated the punishments because of a lack of necessary
103
This decision
evidence and conflicting reports from team officials.
implicitly stated that in suspending the players, Commissioner Goodell
had been overly harsh, which ultimately diminished his power as
commissioner to determine punishments and revealed that the penalties
104
Tagliabue demonstrated the flexibility
were unfair and inconsistent.
that only an independent arbitrator can truly have, and that the
commissioner certainly lacks, in this type of situation. If these disputes
were designed to be heard by an independent tribunal, like the ASAT,
these procedural ills would be eliminated.
The circular nature of the NFL’s disciplinary process was evidenced
105
by Bounty-Gate. The ASAT would provide an independent tribunal
that would significantly reduce the time of an appeals process, and come
to a fair and consistent decision based on the totality of the
circumstances. Thus, the NFL should take serious consideration of an
independent arbitral tribunal that would make the process faster, more
fair, and more consistent.
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101. NEW ORLEANS SAINTS PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE/“BOUNTY,” 8 NFL (2012)
(Tagliabue, Arb.), available at http://sports.cbsimg.net/images/blogs/FinalDecision_Saints_Ap
peal.pdf.
102. Id. at 13. Tagliabue noted that previously players had been fined, but not
suspended for similar conduct. Id.
103. Id. at 22.
104. See id. at 13, 22.
105. Jesse Reed, Reviewing the Complete Timeline of NFL, Saints Bountygate Scandal,
BLEACHER REPORT (Dec. 11, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1441646-reviewingthe-complete-timeline-of-nfl-saints-bountygate-scandal. The NFL initially suspended the
players; the players then filed grievances and appeals and one filed a defamation lawsuit; the
Commissioner rejected the players’ appeals; the players filed another grievance; the grievance
arbitration panel found for the players and ordered Commissioner Goodell to look at the case
again; Goodell recused himself and appointed former-NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue to
hear the case; and finally, Tagliabue vacated the suspensions (and ended the nightmare). Id.
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C. The Basketball Czar: The NBA Commissioner
The majority of issues in the NBA’s disciplinary process have
106
During his
stemmed from the current commissioner, David Stern.
tenure as commissioner, Stern has instituted a dress code, suspended
players for off-court conduct, and fined one organization a quartermillion dollars for resting its star players for one game during a stretch
107
of away games. These examples, among others, demonstrate that the
NBA’s policy for disciplining players and teams is unfair, inconsistent,
and inflexible.
The NBA got off to a much slower start than the MLB and NFL, as
it did not appoint its first commissioner until 1967, and did not give him
108
Prior to 1971, the League President was
broad authority until 1971.
responsible for player discipline, though he only did so in limited
109
One such situation was in 1953 when the NBA
circumstances.
110
President suspended a player indefinitely for gambling. In 1967, then111
President Walter Kennedy’s title was changed to Commissioner.
Seeing the success of this system in the MLB, in 1971 the owners
granted the commissioner expansive authority to discipline players in
112
It was under Kennedy that the players
the League’s best interests.
113
In 1975, Lawrence O’Brien was
unionized and negotiated a CBA.
114
appointed NBA Commissioner.
O’Brien contributed to the NBA’s
merger with the American Basketball Association, but his period as
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106. Sam Amick, NBA Global Games are Proud Accomplishment for Stern, USA
TODAY, Oct. 2, 2013, at C1 (stating that Stern will be stepping down as NBA Commissioner
on Feb. 1, 2014). See generally Lockwood, supra note 69, at 150–69 (discussing the changes to
the NBA Commissioner’s authority while David Stern has held the position).
107. Lockwood, supra note 69, at 150–52; Sam Borden, Basketball Players’ Night Off
Makes a Stand for Sitting Out, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2012, at A1. The players that were rested
include Tim Duncan, Manu Ginobili, and Tony Parker, who have all played more than ten
seasons in the NBA, and all with their current team, the San Antonio Spurs. Id. The Spurs
only lost the game by five points despite not playing their three stars and facing the defending
champion Miami Heat in Miami. Id.
108. Lockwood, supra note 69, at 149.
109. See id. at 147–48.
110. Id.
111. Parlow, supra note 2, at 186; Lockwood, supra note 69, at 149.
112. See Lockwood, supra note 69, at 149; see also Parlow, supra note 2, at 186.
113. Lockwood, supra note 69, at 149.
114. Id. at 150.
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commissioner was mainly notable for economic disputes rather than
115
player discipline.
David Stern has held the position of NBA Commissioner since his
116
appointment in 1984.
During his tenure, Stern has used the “best
interest clause” to expand the power of the commissioner much farther
117
than his predecessors. Stern regulated both on- and off-court conduct,
including an off-court dress code and an on-court dress code that limited
118
accessories players can wear on-court. On the court, Stern prohibited
players from wearing Band-Aids on their faces during games, unless
119
medically necessary, to limit self-promotion.
Additionally, the offcourt dress code requires players to “wear Business Casual attire
120
Stern has
whenever they are engaged in team or league business.”
used his authority to unilaterally create new rules and occasionally issue
121
unprecedented punishments. Through the best interest power, Stern
has also regulated comments that could be viewed as offensive to, or
122
critical of, the referees or the League.
It was under the former
reasoning that Stern fined Dennis Rodman $50,000, the largest fine of
an NBA player at that point, for a comment insulting Mormons after a
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115. Id. This merger would secure the NBA as the dominant basketball league by
absorbing the top four teams of the American Basketball Association, which included such
prominent players as Julius “Dr. J” Erving. Id. at 149–50; Encyclopedia Playoff Edition,
Biography of Julius Erving, NBA.COM, http://www.nba.com/history/players/erving_bio.html
(last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
116. Brent D. Showalter, Technical Foul: David Stern’s Excessive Use of Rule-Making
Authority, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 205, 209 (2007). Recently, Stern announced he will step
down as commissioner in February 2014, his thirtieth year holding the position. Jason Gay,
Stern Gets Ready for the Buzzer, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2012, at D10; David Stern to Step
Down Feb. ‘14, Announces Silver as Successor for NBA Commissioner, SPORTS BUSINESS
DAILY (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2012/10/26/Leaguesand-Governing-Bodies/Stern-retires.aspx. Despite naming a successor, Stern’s replacement
will need to be approved by the owners. Id.
117. See Parlow, supra note 2, at 186–87; Michael R. Wilson, Why So Stern?: The
Growing Power of the NBA Commissioner, 7 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45,
57–60 (2010).
118. Showalter, supra note 116, at 210.
119. Wilson, supra note 117, at 57–58.
120. Id. at 55–56 (quoting NBA Player Dress Code, NBA.COM (Oct. 20, 2005, 6:42 PM),
http://www.nba.com/news/player_dress_code_051017.html). Stern was trying to diminish the
NBA’s “hip-hop” reputation that he feared was damaging the public’s view of the game.
Showalter, supra note 116, at 210.
121. See Wilson, supra note 117, at 57–59.
122. Id. at 59–60.
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123

game in Utah. Under the latter reasoning, Stern has repeatedly fined
Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban for disparaging the referees
124
through various media outlets.
Commissioner Stern has also been criticized for his inflexible
approach to discipline under the rule that requires players to stay in “the
125
One
immediate vicinity of their bench” during a fight on the court.
example of this inflexible approach occurred following the 2007 Western
Conference Semifinals, where in game four San Antonio Spurs forward
Robert Horry flagrantly fouled Steve Nash, the star guard of the
126
Phoenix Suns and two-time League MVP.
Two Suns players,
including star forward Amare Stoudemire, immediately jumped up from
127
the bench following the incident. While they merely stepped onto the
128
court, they were both suspended for one game.
Meanwhile, Tim
Duncan, the San Antonio superstar forward, also stepped onto the
court, but because the altercation occurred closer to the Suns’ bench, he
129
was not suspended. This situation demonstrates the inconsistency and
inflexibility of Commissioner Stern’s punishments. Additionally, under
the CBA, players may only appeal to the commissioner, who made the
130
Like the NFL and MLB commissioners,
decision to suspend them.
Commissioner Stern would be in a conflict of interest hearing an appeal
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123. Christopher J. McKinny, Comment, Professional Sports Leagues and the First
Amendment: A Closed Marketplace, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 223, 248–49 (2003). Rodman
was punished for saying Mormons were “asshole[s].” ELLIS CASHMORE, SPORTS CULTURE:
AN A–Z GUIDE 202 (2000); McKinny, supra, at 248–49.
124. Wilson, supra note 117, at 59–60.
125. Three Players Suspended Following Spurs-Suns Incident, NBA.COM (May 15, 2007,
7:02 PM), http://www.nba.com/news/spurssunssuspension_070515.html (quoting BASKETBAL
L OPERATIONS DEP’T, OFFICIAL RULES OF THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION 20
06–2007, § VII.c (2006), available at http://www.nba.com/media/rule_book _2006-07.pdf); see
also Jeffrey A. Mishkin, Dispute Resolution in the NBA: The Allocation of Decision Making
Among the Commissioner, Impartial Arbitrator, System Arbitrator, and the Courts, 35 VAL. U.
L. REV. 449, 452 (2001).
126. Three Players Suspended Following Spurs-Suns Incident, supra note 125.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Marc Stein, NBA Suspends Stoudemire, Diaw for Leaving Bench, ESPN.COM (May
16, 2007, 8:36 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/playoffs2007/news/story?id=2871615.
130. See Mishkin, supra note 125, at 452. If the player feels the commissioner abused his
power in making the decision, then the player can file a grievance against the League, which
an independent arbitrator would hear. See Lockwood, supra note 69 at 154. The League’s
collective bargaining agreement is discussed infra notes 192–201 and accompanying text.
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131

to a decision in which he participated.
This example is another
illustration of a situation that the ASAT would improve.
Two other events have shaped the perception of the NBA
Commissioner and his ultimate authority. The first was the suspension
132
of Latrell Sprewell in the winter of 1997. Sprewell was asked to leave
a practice by his coach, but instead of leaving, Sprewell wrestled the
133
coach to the ground and choked him.
Once separated, Sprewell
continued to destroy team property and attacked the coach again,
134
grazing him with one punch. After performing an investigation of the
135
incident, Commissioner Stern suspended Sprewell for one full year.
However, Sprewell filed a grievance, and the arbitrator selected by the
NBA and National Basketball Players Association (NBPA) reduced the
suspension to the remainder of the current season, or from eighty-two to
136
This situation is an example of how an
only sixty-eight games.
independent arbitration can be effective, but also of the arbitrator’s
likelihood to find a middle ground of punishment that will leave both
137
parties unhappy. This problem is likely caused by the fact that either
side can fire an arbitrator for any reason, and would be solved by the
proposed ASAT because the tribunal would be independent from both
138
parties and require reasons for firing arbitrators.
The second event involved a situation similar to the Sprewell
arbitration. In 2004 a brawl broke out at a Detroit Pistons game against
139
the Indiana Pacers. Three Pacers players were suspended for violence
against fans because the NBA determined that since the conduct
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131. Mark Kriegel, In His Twilight, Stern Coming up Small, FOX SPORTS (Dec. 13, 2011,
11:49 AM), http://msn.foxsports.com/nba/story/nba-david-stern-running-new-orleans-hornetsrejecting-trades-has-become-incredible-shrinking-commissioner-121211.
132. See Lockwood, supra note 69, at 152.
133. Id. at 152–53.
134. Id. at 153.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 154; Parlow, supra note 2, at 195.
137. In this case the fact that Sprewell’s suspension was reduced is unfathomable; had
the coach decided to press charges, Sprewell could have easily been arrested for assault and
battery of his employer. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 240, 242 (West 2008). The arbitrator seemed
to not want to side with either party for fear of a vengeance firing from the other side. See
infra note 193 and accompanying text. See generally Belson, supra note 23 (discussing the
firing of an experienced arbitrator after an unpopular decision). If the Sprewell situation was
not worthy of a full-year suspension, then presumably nothing will be under the current
system.
138. See discussion infra Parts III.C, VI.
139. Lockwood, supra note 69, at 156.
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occurred during an NBA game, it was necessarily on-court conduct.
The NBPA filed a grievance and appealed the suspensions to the
grievance arbitrator, but the NBA refused to participate because it
141
When the
believed the suspensions were not subject to arbitration.
arbitrator reduced the players’ suspensions, the NBA sued the NBPA,
arguing that because the conduct was on-court the arbitrator had no
142
jurisdiction. However, a New York district court held that because the
specific conduct did not typically occur during the course of the game, it
was not on-court conduct and was thus subject to appeal to the
143
The arbitrator found that Commissioner Stern
grievance arbitrator.
did not have “just cause” to suspend at least one of the players, so the
144
suspensions were reduced. This fight is yet another example of how
the current arbitration system in the NBA leaves both parties with
145
disappointing results.
While the Pacers and the Sprewell situations give the impression that
the independent arbitration provision in the NBA’s CBA is effective,
both processes took longer than necessary and produced results that
146
These examples
were unsatisfactory to both parties involved.
exemplify that players have little protection from inconsistent rulings
under the current disciplinary structure. Commissioner Stern has also
147
demonstrated remarkable inflexibility in determining discipline. This
system could be improved by allowing an independent tribunal to hear a
greater number of disciplinary inquiries, which would increase the
fairness, consistency, and flexibility of the process.
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140. Sirotkin, supra note 2, at 306–07.
141. Id.
142. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, No. 04 Civ. 9528(GBD),
2005 WL 22869, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
143. Id. at *11.
144. Lockwood, supra note 69, at 157–58.
145. See id. This incident was a severe black-eye on the NBA and clearly a situation
where the commissioner should have been able to suspend players under the best interest
clause. See Artest, Jackson Charge Palace Stands, ESPN.COM (Nov. 21, 2004, 2:57 AM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=1927380.
146. See Lockwood, supra note 69, at 155–56.
147. See supra notes 118–29 and accompanying text.
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D. The Most Recent Development: The NHL Commissioner
Until 1992, the most powerful position in the NHL League office
148
was the President. In order to lure Gary Bettman, then the General
Counsel of the NBA, away from the NBA the owners offered him a new
149
position: NHL Commissioner. This position expanded the authority of
the President to include a similar power to the commissioners of other
150
professional sports leagues. Over the course of his tenure, the NHL
has endured three lockouts and, in an attempt to increase public interest
151
In addition to recent
in the game, instituted various rule changes.
152
inconsistent discipline, Bettman has also resorted to an exceptional
suspension in multiple cases involving extreme on-ice misconduct,
153
These four
punishing four players for “the rest of the season.”
incidents involved: one player sucker-punching another in the back of
the head; one player striking another player in the face with his stick;
one player using his stick to strike another player in the side of the head;
154
and one player elbowing another in the head. By disciplining all four
players for “the rest of the season,” Commissioner Bettman avoided
setting a precedent for similar conduct. Additionally, despite the fact
that the commissioner has the authority to discipline for off-ice conduct,
he chose not to discipline Dany Heatley when Heatley was arrested for
reckless driving and charged with vehicular homicide for driving over
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148. Thomas J. Arkell, National Hockey League Jurisprudence: Past, Present and Future,
8 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 135, 136 (1998).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Gary Bettman, SPORTS E-CYCLOPEDIA (Feb. 12, 2013, 11:30 PM),
http://www.sportsecyclopedia.com/nhl/comish/bettman.html. These rule changes included an
impromptu rule interpretation change during the 1999 Stanley Cup finals in which during the
third overtime Dallas Stars forward Brett Hull scored a goal with a skate in the crease, which
had previously been characterized as a situation where a goal would be disallowed, but the
referees allowed the goal and the Stars won the Stanley Cup over the Buffalo Sabres.
Controversy Continues, CNNSI.COM (June 22, 1999, 8:11 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.co
m/hockey/nhl/1999/playoffs/news/1999/06/20/sabres_bitter/. After the game, NHL officials
upheld the goal despite a goal crease rule that had been enforced under a no-tolerance policy
throughout the season. Id. The Sabres have never returned to the Stanley Cup finals.
Stanley Cup Champions and Finalists, NHL.COM, http://www.nhl.com/ice/page.htm?id=25426
(last visited Dec. 31, 2013).
152. See supra notes 5–15 and accompanying text.
153. Jamie Fitzpatrick, The Longest NHL Suspensions, ABOUT, http://proicehockey.
about.com/cs/history/a/nhl_suspensions.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2013). The longest was for
twenty-five games and the shortest for ten games. Id.
154. Id.
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eighty miles-per-hour in a thirty-five miles-per-hour zone and crashing
155
his Ferrari, which resulted in the death of his teammate and friend.
This same conduct would likely have been suspension-worthy in any of
156
the other three leagues.
While the advent of the commissioner has undoubtedly helped the
four major American professional sports leagues develop and thrive in
157
the last century, the disciplinary structure outlined by each league’s
158
CBA has left much to be desired for both leagues and players. In each
league, the commissioner has seemingly unbeatable power to distribute
discipline at his discretion without regard to any system of precedence
159
or an explicitly defined code. He is limited only by vague provisions in
160
The commissioner system
the league’s CBA or league constitution.
has been so economically successful that it would make little sense to
completely abolish it, but establishing an independent arbitral tribunal
161
to hear appeals would make the system more fair and consistent. This
new structure would alleviate the commissioners of appeal
responsibilities while retaining the commissioners’ power to discipline.
Instead, this new body would establish a system of precedent to increase
the integrity of the leagues and remove much of the public criticism of
commissioners that arises when commissioners hear appeals to their
162
own disciplinary decisions. The ASAT would thus achieve the best of

D5.

155. Ray Glier, Heatley Sentenced to 3 Years’ Probation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2005, at
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156. See, e.g., Benjamin Hochman, Nuggets’ Smith Suspended 7 Games, DENVER POST
(Aug. 28, 2009, 2:53 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/nuggets/ci_13223490#ixzz0ejFsIlVu
(noting that the NBA suspended J.R. Smith for a reckless driving accident resulting in the
death of his friend); Ex-O’s Hurler Ponson Gets Five Days for DWI, ESPN.COM, Dec. 12,
2005, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2256427 (explaining that MLB’s Sidney
Ponson’s contract was terminated by the team one week after Ponson was convicted of
driving while impaired); Little Charged with Felony DUI, Speeding, ESPN.COM, Apr. 27,
2004, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=1790240 (noting that the NFL suspended
Leonard Little for the first half of the 1999 season without pay after he pled guilty to
involuntary manslaughter for a traffic accident).
157. Gregor Lentze, The Legal Concept of Professional Sports Leagues: The
Commissioner and an Alternative Approach from a Corporate Perspective, 6 MARQ. SPORTS
L.J. 65, 67 (1995).
158. See Sirotkin, supra note 2, at 304–09; Belson, supra note 23; Heimlich, supra note
15.
159. See Sirotkin, supra note 2, at 291, 299–302.
160. Id. at 292–98.
161. See Lentze, supra note 157, at 67.
162. See, e.g., Mishkin, supra note 125, at 452; Reece, supra note 66, at 361; Sirotkin,
supra note 2, at 291, 300–01.
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both worlds by maintaining the power of the commissioner to act in the
best interests of the league while curtailing negative publicity and
increasing public trust in the system and the sport.
III. CURRENT GOVERNING DOCUMENTS
Each of the professional American sports leagues are governed by
various documents, including constitutions, league bylaws, and most
163
importantly, CBAs.
The CBA for each league establishes the
164
procedures and scope of the disciplinary system. This Part will explore
the arbitration provisions in the governing documents of the MLB, NFL,
NBA, and NHL. It will also assess what aspects are effective and can be
incorporated into the ASAT, as well as those that are ineffective and
how they should be changed by the ASAT.
A. The MLB’s Governing Documents
The MLB has three different systems of arbitration: one for salary
165
disputes, one for on-field discipline, and one for all other grievances.
Salary arbitration will not be discussed in this Comment because it is a
166
completely separate system that does not involve player discipline.
For appeals of discipline stemming from on-field conduct or “conduct
that is materially detrimental or materially prejudicial to the best
interest of Baseball,” players participate in a hearing in front of the
167
Executive Vice President, Administration, or the MLB Commissioner.
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163. ROGER I. ABRAMS, SPORTS JUSTICE: THE LAW & THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS 90
(2010); MATTHEW J. MITTEN, SPORTS LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 49 (Roger Blanpain et
al. eds., Wolters Kluwer 2011).
164. Jan Stiglitz, Player Discipline in Team Sports, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 167, 168 (1995),
reprinted in SPORTS LAW & REGULATION 129, 131 (Joseph Gordon Hylton & Paul M.
Anderson eds., 1999).
165. MLB CBA, supra note 54, at art. VI, § E, arts. XI, XII.
166. See generally id. at art. VI, § E (providing the procedures and rules regarding salary
arbitration of MLB players).
167. Id. at art. XII, § A–B, art. XI, § C(1)(a)–(b). These hearings usually arise from
suspensions due to a fight on the field, touching an umpire, or a pitcher intentionally hitting a
batter. See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, 2012 EDITION OFFICIAL BASEBALL RULES R. 9.05
(2012), available at http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/y2012/Official_Baseball_Rules.pdf;
e.g., Matt Snyder, Devin Mesoraco Likely Faces Suspension After Making Contact with
Umpire, CBSSPORTS.COM (July 30, 2012, 8:55 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/blog/eyeon-baseball/19691226/devin-mesoraco-likely-faces-suspension-after-making-contact-withumpire; Todd Zolecki, Hamels Suspended 5 Games for Hitting Harper, MLB.COM (May 8,
2012, 4:27 PM), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20120507&content_id=30648282&v
key=news_mlb&c_id=mlb; Suspensions Doled Out for MLB Brawl, USA TODAY, June 19,
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2007, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/2007-06-18-brawl-suspensions_N.htm.
168. MLB CBA, supra note 54, at art. XII, § D.
169. MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. II, §§ 2–3 (2008), available at http://bizofbaseball.com/
docs/MLConsititutionJune2005Update.pdf.
170. MLB CBA, supra note 54, at art. XII, § D.
171. Id. at art. XI, § B. These grievances include suspensions under the drug policy as
well as all other non-disciplinary grievances allowable in the CBA. Id. at art. XI, § A(1).
172. Id. at art. XI, § A(9).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at art. XI, § B.
176. Further discussion of the ASAT specific policies and proposed provisions can be
found infra Part V.
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In these cases, players are given the right to all evidence the League uses
in an investigation regarding that player’s discipline and can challenge
168
the just cause for their punishment.
Additionally, the best interests
clause can be found in the MLB Constitution, establishing that the
commissioner may investigate and punish anything he believes is “not in
169
the best interests of the national game of Baseball.” The ASAT would
not alter the first step in these punishments; the League CBA would still
govern player discipline and allow the commissioner, or a representative
of the commissioner’s office, to impose penalties on players for on- and
off-field conduct. The ASAT would incorporate the MLB’s approach to
appealing discipline by providing all evidence the league used in the
investigation, but the challenge hearing would be conducted by ASAT
170
instead of by the League.
The arbitration system for all other grievances under the CBA takes
much more time to resolve because they are conducted by the
171
arbitration panel, which is composed of two-party arbitrators (one
appointed by the League and one by the Players’ Association) and one
172
“impartial” arbitrator. This impartial arbitrator must be agreed upon
by the League and the Association, otherwise the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) submits a list of potential arbitrators that the
173
These impartial
League and Association must narrow down to one.
arbitrators can be fired at any time, for any reason, by either the League
174
or the Association, so long as they are not currently handling a case.
Decisions by the panels may not create precedent and are final and
175
binding.
None of these policies would be incorporated into the
ASAT; in fact, the ASAT would use essentially the opposite of these
176
provisions.

34609-mqt_97-2 Sheet No. 146 Side A

03/17/2014 11:30:34

ABRAMS-FINAL (CORRECT MARCH) (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

MAKING THE RIGHT CALL

3/10/2014 12:33 PM

497

B. The NFL’s Governing Documents
The NFL employs three types of arbitrators that each rule on
different conflicts: an impartial arbitrator, a notice arbitrator, and a
177
system arbitrator.
However, player discipline doled out by the NFL
Commissioner is not included in any of the provisions that fall under any
178
of these arbitrators’ jurisdiction. Instead, the commissioner assigns a
179
League officer representative to hear a player’s appeal. His power to
180
hear these appeals is found in the NFL Constitution. Additionally, his
disciplinary powers include the power to punish any “conduct
detrimental to the best interests of the League or professional
181
These appeals are heard between eight to thirteen days
football.”
182
from the player’s filing for appeal of punishment. The CBA provides
for a minimum fine for each year and, before the beginning of the
183
season, the league and the NFLPA agree on a schedule of fines. Still,
the league may increase fines or suspensions “[w]here circumstances
184
warrant,” including where infractions were “flagrant and gratuitous.”
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177. NFL CBA, supra note 72, at arts. 15, 16, 43. The impartial arbitrator has authority
to rule over decisions involving free agency, rookie compensation, the draft, some salary cap
concerns, and most non-injury issues. Id. at arts. 6, 8–10, 13, 21, 23, 26. The system arbitrator
is responsible for all other issues. Id. at arts. 1, 4, 6–19, 26–28, 31, 68–70. The league and the
players association agreed on a notice arbitrator, who is responsible for selecting the four
non-injury grievance or impartial arbitrators. Id. at art. 43, § 6. The most senior non-injury
grievance arbitrator is next in line for the position of notice arbitrator. Id. These arbitrators
can also be fired by either side for any reason, but only during a ten-day window in July. Id.
178. Id. at art. 46.
179. Id. at art 46, § 2(a). The commissioner can elect to hear the appeal himself at his
discretion. Id. Since the league office has handed down the punishment, this in essence
allows the same party to be the police, prosecution, judge, and jury.
180. CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE art. VIII, § 8.3 (2006),
available at http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/static/html/careers/pdf/co_.pdf.
181. Id. at art. VIII, § 8.3(E).
182. NFL CBA, supra note 72, at art 46, § 2(i).
183. Id. at art. 46, § 1(d).
184. Id. Unfortunately, the CBA does not articulate what these terms mean. See id.
Various players believe the league is “out to get them” and for some it is with good reason.
Ashley Dunkak, Carolina Safety Mike Mitchell Takes Thinly Veiled Shot at Ndamukong Suh,
CBS DETROIT (Oct. 28, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://detroit.cbslocal.com/2013/10/28/carolinasafety-mike-mitchell-takes-thinly-veiled-shot-at-ndamukong-suh/; Michael David Smith,
Merton Hanks: I Fined Ndamukong Suh to Get His Attention, NBC SPORTS (Oct. 19, 2013,
7:40 AM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013/10/19/merton-hanks-i-fined-ndamukongsuh-to-get-his-attention/. The league does not help its cause by keeping the CBA terms vague
because questions of subjectivity are inevitable. Additionally, many, including Redskins
Head Coach Mike Shanahan, would like to see the procedure change so that the appeals are
conducted in a more timely manner and players would miss less time while the League makes
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Additionally, players can be punished by the league for violating the
PCP, which outlines the types of behavior the commissioner finds
185
detrimental to the league.
On the other hand, the league can only
reduce a fine “if it exceeds 25 percent of one week of a player’s salary
for a first offense, and 50 percent of one week of a player’s salary for a
second offense,” or if the player argues that the circumstances do not
186
These fines do not contribute to the
warrant the scheduled fine.
League workers’ salary, instead half of the fines go to the players’
assistance trust and the remaining half are donated to a charity on which
187
the NFL and NFLPA agree.
While the appeals from player discipline are not currently delegated
to an arbitrator under the NFL’s CBA, these appeals would be handled
188
by the ASAT.
The NFL does a commendable job of attempting
expeditious hearings, and a similar provision would be in place in the
ASAT to ensure players would not miss unnecessary time or play when
189
they should be suspended. If the athlete receiving discipline decides to
appeal, the League would also have to provide any evidence used and
give reasoning for the fine or suspension if it differed from punishments
set forth in the CBA. One aspect of the NFL CBA that would most
certainly be imitated is the distribution of player fines, which would go
190
to one of a list of charities. Also, while the NFL provides a policy for
increasing fines according to a particular schedule, it should provide
more detail as to what conduct is “flagrant and gratuitous,” as it would
191
have to prove the extent of such conduct to the ASAT panel.
C. The NBA’s Governing Documents
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its decision. John Keim, Coach: Appeal Process Needs Change, ESPN (Oct. 25, 2013, 2:54
PM),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/9877119/mike-shanahan-coach-washington-redskinsthinks-appeal-process-change.
185. NFL PCP, supra note 78.
186. NFL CBA, supra note 72, at art. 46, § 1(d).
187. Id. at art. 46, § 5(c).
188. Id. at art. 46, § 2(a).
189. Id. at art. 46, § 2(i).
190. Id.
191. Id. at art. 46, § 1(d).
192. NAT’L BASKETBALL ASS’N & NAT’L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS’N., NBA
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT arts. XXXI & XXXII (2011) [hereinafter NBA
CBA], available at http://www.nbpa.org/cba/2011. The system arbitrator handles mostly
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192
grievance arbitrator and a system arbitrator. The grievance arbitrator
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is scheduled to serve for the length of the CBA, but can be terminated
193
by either party during a six-day window each summer. The grievance
arbitrator is responsible for handling disciplinary disputes, but only
those disputes arising from a fine of at least fifty-thousand dollars or a
suspension of at least twelve games, anything less can only be appealed
194
to the commissioner. For these smaller appeals, the commissioner has
the authority to affirm or reduce the fine or suspension, but cannot
195
increase it. For the larger appeals, the grievance arbitrator must use
an “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review of the commissioner’s
196
decision. Like the NFL, the NBA has a list of some of the off-court
conduct that will result in punishment and a schedule of fines, but it is
197
not very specific.
Additionally, hearings cannot take place
immediately, or even quickly, because each side is guaranteed thirty
198
days’ notice. In preparation for the hearings, the parties must submit a
joint statement of the issue and are required to present all relevant
199
evidence to the other side at least a week in advance of the hearing.
The arbitrator is granted broad authority to make decisions related to
smaller issues, such as procedural matters and jurisdiction, and his or
200
her decision is final and binding.
The NBA uses a structure that only allows for an arbitrator to rule
on the most serious penalties while handling smaller penalties in201
202
house, a system the ASAT would alter.
Further, while the NBA
203
provides a schedule for fines and suspensions, it would have to be
more fully developed to include more specific conduct so the arbitrators
could avoid having to interpret ambiguous CBA provisions. The
schedule for hearings would also be changed to be more efficient, while
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monetary disputes, including those related to free agency. Id. at art. XXXII, § 1.
193. Id. at art. XXXI, § 7(a). If the arbitrator is fired and the league and the players
association cannot agree on the next arbitrator, the International Institute for Conflict
Prevention and Resolution submits a list of eleven lawyers that the parties can choose from to
be the next grievance arbitrator. Id. at art. XXXI, § 7(b).
194. Id. at art. XXXI, § 9(a).
195. Id. at art. XXXI, § 9(a)(4).
196. Id. at art. XXXI, § 9(b).
197. See id. at art. VI.
198. Id. at art. XXXI, § 4(a).
199. Id. at art. XXXI, § 5(a)–(b).
200. Id. at art. XXXI, § 6.
201. Id. at art. XXXI, § 9(a).
202. Further discussion of this system infra Part V.A.
203. NBA CBA, supra note 192, at art. XXXI, § 9.
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maintaining effectiveness, and the arbitrators would have similar
authority to rule on smaller issues, such as arbitrability and procedural
issues. These arbitrators would also have similar security throughout
the year, except that in order to be fired, a party must provide just cause
204
for termination, as opposed to firing for any reason.
D. The NHL’s Governing Documents
Similar to the MLB and NFL, the NHL and the National Hockey
League Players’ Association (NHLPA) appoint an impartial arbitrator
205
to serve for the duration of the CBA. Either party may dismiss this
impartial arbitrator each year by giving the arbitrator written notice on
206
or before September 1.
The NHL CBA allows the commissioner to
207
discipline players for both on-ice and off-ice conduct. For the on-ice
discipline, the commissioner, or his designee, may impose a fine or
suspension on a player for “the use of excessive and unnecessary force
208
By including “resulting in
and reckless acts resulting in injury.”
injury,” the NHL distinguishes itself greatly from the NFL, NBA, and
209
MLB. In determining the punishment, the League office considers the
player’s intent, the specific conduct, any resulting injuries, past offenses,
210
and game situations. For suspensions up to five games or fines over
five-thousand dollars, the player has the right to a telephonic hearing
211
with the League, which is held as soon as reasonably possible.
If a
player decides to appeal the League’s disciplinary decision, the
commissioner decides whether another hearing (either telephonic or in-
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204. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
205. NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE & NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYER’S ASS’N,
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE AND
NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION: SEPTEMBER 16, 2012–SEPTEMBER
15, 2022 art. 17, § 6 (2012) [hereinafter NHL CBA], available at http://www.nhl.com/nhl/en/v3/
ext/CBA2012/NHL_NHLPA_2013_CBA.pdf. The impartial arbitrator must be a member of
the National Academy of Arbitrators. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at arts. 18, 18-A.
208. Id. at art. 18, §§ 1–2.
209. Id. at art. 18, § 2. This factor creates considerable confusion and the appearance of
subjectivity in discipline because the league has given it great weight in decision-making,
perhaps more so than the player’s intent. See supra notes 5–15 and accompanying text.
210. NHL CBA, supra note 205, at art. 18, § 2. For instance, a particularly hard hit in a
close game may not result in a suspension where it might if the game is lopsided. Id.
211. Id. at art. 18, §§ 4(b)(i), 8(a). The league is also required to give the NHLPA any
evidence it plans to use prior to the hearing. Id. at art. 18, § 4(b)(ii).
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212

person) is necessary.
If the commissioner hears the appeal, he
determines if the League’s decision "was supported by clear and
213
convincing evidence.”
In these appeals, the commissioner’s ultimate
214
disciplinary decision is final and binding. Like the other leagues, the
NHL Constitution also grants the commissioner the authority to hear
215
disputes and issue discipline.
For suspensions of six games or more, players have a right to an in216
person hearing with a League representative.
If a player elects to
appeal that decision, the commissioner must conduct an in-person
hearing with the player using the same “clear and convincing”
217
standard. For these more serious suspensions, the player may appeal
the commissioner’s decision to a Neutral Discipline Arbitrator (NDA),
who will conduct a third in-person hearing to determine whether the
218
Like the
suspension was supported by “substantial evidence.”
impartial arbitrator, the NDA is appointed to serve for the duration of
the term but may be discharged each year by either party upon notice
219
If a hearing is necessary after dismissing one
on or before July 1.
NDA but before replacing her, the impartial arbitrator conducts the
220
hearing.
The commissioner also has the power to discipline players for
violation of off-ice League rules or conduct “that is detrimental to or
against the welfare of the League or the game of hockey,” similar to the
221
Under the CBA, the
other leagues’ best interests clauses.
commissioner can suspend or expel a player, fine a player, or cancel a
222
player’s contract.
Under this provision, the commissioner must
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C M
Y K

34609-mqt_97-2 Sheet No. 148 Side A

212. Id. at art. 18, § 12.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. CONST. OF THE NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE, art. VI, § 6.3(b), (j), available at
http://www.bizofhockey.com/docs/NHLConsitution.pdf.
216. NHL CBA, supra note 205, at art. 18, § 9.
217. Id. at art. 18, § 12.
218. Id. at art. 18, § 13(c). The NDA’s decision is final and binding. Id. During this
entire process, the player is prevented from playing in a game, at least up to the length of the
suspension. Id. at art. 18, § 13(b).
219. Id. at art. 18, § 14(a). The NDA is supposed to have “substantial experience as an
arbitrator or judge,” but no sports familiarity is required. Id. at art. 18, § 14(c). In fact, the
other prerequisite is the ability to be in Toronto or New York for the potential hearings. Id.
220. Id. at art. 18, § 14(d).
221. Id. at art. 18-A, § 2.
222. Id. at art. 18-A, § 2(a)–(c). While cancelling a contract is very unlikely,
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conduct a hearing, the result of which can be appealed to the impartial
223
arbitrator.
The impartial arbitrator considers the surrounding
circumstances, the proportionality of the penalty to the offense, and the
interests of both the League and player in determining whether the
punishment is supported by substantial evidence and is not
224
unreasonable.
While certain provisions of the MLB, NFL, NBA, and NHL CBAs
could be incorporated into an effective and efficient arbitral body, most
provisions would run counter to the goal of the ASAT. The proposed
arbitral tribunal would not alter the current immediate disciplinary
provisions of the CBAs; it would only affect the appeals procedures, as
will be discussed in Part VI. Thus, the leagues could still collectively
bargain for disciplinary procedures, conduct that will result in
punishment, and the types of penalties that can be imposed; the ASAT
225
would make sure that the leagues abide by these agreements.
IV. EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS
Throughout the world numerous international sports courts and
professional sports leagues have developed their own systems of
discipline. Three that have been particularly successful and contain
elements that could be successfully incorporated in American
professional sports are the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), the
Basketball Arbitral Tribunal (BAT), and Australia’s National Rugby
226
These three systems do not use a commissioner
League (NRL).
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Commissioner Bettman cancelled a contract between Ilya Kovalchuk and the New Jersey
Devils because he believed the parties were attempting to circumvent the League salary cap.
Tarik El-Bashir, NHL Fights Back in Contract Battle, WASH. POST, July 22, 2010, at D6. The
parties eventually restructured the deal, which the NHL accepted, but Kovalchuk
unexpectedly retired in the summer 2013; leaving $77 million of the total $100 million on the
table and returning to Russia to play in the Russian Hockey League instead. Kevin Allen,
Ilya Kovalchuk Says He’s Retiring from NHL, USA TODAY (July 12, 2013, 1:17 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nhl/devils/2013/07/11/ilya-kovalchuk-announcesretirement-new-jersey-devils/2509857/.
223. NHL CBA, supra note 205, at art. 18-A, §§ 3(d), 4.
224. Id. at art. 18-A, § 4.
225. See MLB CBA, supra note 54, at arts. XI–XII; NBA CBA, supra note 192, at arts.
VI, XXXI; NFL CBA, supra note 72, at art. 46; NHL CBA, supra note 205, at arts. 17, 18, 18A.
226. See MITTEN ET AL., supra note 22, at 321; Ian Dobinson & David Thorpe, What’s
Wrong With the Commissioner? Some Lessons from Downunder, 19 SETON HALL J. SPORTS
& ENT. L. 105, 110–11 (2009); Dirk-Reiner Martens, Basketball Arbitral Tribunal,
INNOVATING JUSTICE, http://www.innovatingjustice.com/innovations/Basketball-Arbitral-
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structure and have alternative arrangements that this Part will explore.
Much like Part III, this Part will assess the effectiveness of each aspect
of these systems and determine whether they can, and should, be
incorporated into the proposed ASAT. By integrating the effective
features from various different structures, the ASAT would balance the
challenges faced by the individual systems and ultimately create what
could be the most fair and consistent disciplinary structure in the world
of sports.
A. The World’s Largest International Sports Court: CAS
227

The CAS is located in Lausanne, Switzerland and resolves various
international sport disputes, including disputes involving athletes in
Olympic sports, international football, and any other sport disciplinary
cases that involve athletes with a CAS arbitration provision in their
228
contracts. The International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS)
is a group of twenty members that creates and amends the code that
229
ICAS members are elected to renewable four-year
governs CAS.
periods by the International Sports Federations, National Olympic
230
Committees, and the International Olympic Committee. The ICAS is
responsible for appointing and removing CAS arbitrators and supervises
231
the CAS Court Office.
The CAS maintains more than 150 arbitrators with legal training and
232
233
These arbitrators are listed publicly, and are
sports backgrounds.
234
expected to perform their duties objectively and independently. While
CAS decisions are publicly available if all parties agree, the arbitrators
235
are bound by a duty of confidentiality. The applicable division of CAS
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Tribunal (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
227. COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORTS, Statutes of the Bodies Working for the
Settlement of Sports-Related Disputes, in TAS/CAS CODE § 1 (2013) [hereinafter CAS
STATUTES], available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/4962/5048/0/Code2020132
0corrections20finales20(en).pdf.
228. History of the CAS: Types of Disputes Submitted to the CAS, TAS/CAS,
http://www.tas-cas.org/en/infogenerales.asp/4-3-239-1011-4-1-1/5-0-1011-3-0-0/ (last visited
Jan. 13, 2013).
229. CAS STATUTES, supra note 227, §§ 2, 4, 6.
230. Id. §§ 4–5.
231. Id. § 6.3, .7.
232. Id. §§ 13–14.
233. Id. § 15.
234. Id. § 18.
235. COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORTS, Procedural Rules, in TAS/CAS CODE R. 43
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for American sports leagues is the Appeals Arbitration Division, which
resolves disputes between athletes and federations, associations, or
236
other sports bodies. All arbitrators can be challenged within a week of
the party finding grounds for a challenge, such as subjectivity or
237
previous relationship between the arbitrator and the other party.
The CAS arbitrators have the authority to determine if the case is
238
within CAS jurisdiction, so no outside court assistance is necessary. A
panel contains three arbitrators, unless otherwise determined by the
239
organization’s document containing the CAS arbitration provision.
Usually, both the claimant and respondent select a single arbitrator, and
those two arbitrators select the third; however, unlike the MLB system,
240
all three arbitrators must be impartial. The panel has the authority to
require either party to produce any documents or other evidence that it
241
believes is likely to exist and is relevant. The parties can either elect
that the panel apply general principles of fairness and justice or request
242
that the panel apply the laws of a particular jurisdiction.
When an
organization disciplines an athlete, that athlete has three weeks to file an
appeal, unless another time limit exists in the organization’s governing
243
documents. The CAS can affirm a Federation’s decision, make a new
decision that replaces it, or annul it and refer the case back to the
244
Whatever the result, all CAS decisions are final and
Federation.
245
binding on the parties.
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(2013) [hereinafter CAS PROCEDURAL RULES], available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/
document/4962/5048/0/Code20201320corrections20finales20(en).pdf; CAS STATUTES, supra
note 227, § 19.
236. CAS STATUTES, supra note 227, § 20.b.
237. Id. § 34.
238. CAS PROCEDURAL RULES, supra note 235, at R. 39. The claimant is required to
pay 1,000 Swiss francs for the CAS to hear the case. Id. at R. 64.1. The panel would then
determine an estimate cost of the proceeding that must be paid in advance. Id. at R. 64.2. It
can also award reasonable attorney’s fees. Id. at R. 64.1.
239. Id. at R. 50.
240. Compare id. at R. 40.2, with MLB CBA, supra note 54, at art. XI, § A(9).
241. CAS PROCEDURAL RULES, supra note 235, at R. 44.3.
242. Id. at R. 45, 58.
243. Id. at R. 49.
244. Id. at R. 57.
245. Id. at R. 46. The only recourse one can have from a CAS decision is an appeal to
the Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT) because the seat of CAS is in Lausanne, Switzerland. Id. at
R. 47; Matthew J. Mitten & Timothy Davis, Athlete Eligibility Requirements and Legal
Protection of Sports Participation Opportunities, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 80 (2008). The
SFT will only review cases on very limited grounds: erroneous jurisdiction; failure to rule on
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While the ASAT would solely involve disputes involving leagues
from North America, like the CAS it would involve athletes from across
246
the globe who speak many different languages. As will be discussed in
the next Part, the ASAT would likely incorporate many of the CAS’s
policies because it is to date the largest and most prominent arbitral
tribunal specifically dedicated to sports-related issues, and, like the goal
247
of ASAT, it only hears appeals.
B. The Newest International Sports Court: BAT
The International Basketball Federation recently established an
248
The BAT,
independent arbitral tribunal specifically for basketball.
249
like CAS, was established in Switzerland.
BAT arbitrations are
conducted before a single arbitrator, who is appointed by the BAT
250
The arbitrator has the authority to
President on a rotational basis.
rule on jurisdiction issues as well as to stop the proceedings if he or she
believes the arbitration rules are not the appropriate realm to resolve
251
the dispute. This arbitrator can be challenged if there are legitimate
doubts about his or her independence; such a challenge must be brought
“within seven days after the ground for the challenge” becomes known
252
to the BAT President.
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claim; ruling on unclaimed issues; and irregular panel formation. Id. at 86.
TAS/CAS,
http://www.tas246. See
History
of
the
CAS:
Origins,
cas.org/en/infogenerales.asp/4-3-234-1011-4-1-1/5-0-1011-3-0-0/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2013).
The need for an internationally conscious system is apparent with the increase of foreign
players in the North American leagues. See Percentage of Foreign Players Rises,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 5, 2012, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. D9TV1DV81; Joel
Millman, These Days, Everybody’s All-American Just May Be a Haitian, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4,
2009, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB125987130978175269; NHL Nationalit
y Breakdown from 1917–18 to 2013–14, QUANTHOCKEY.COM, http://www.quanthockey.com
/TS/TS_PlayerNationalities.php (last visited Feb. 7, 2013); Record-Tying 84 International
Players on Opening-Night Rosters, NBA.COM (Oct. 31, 2012, 1:20 AM), http://www.nba.com
/2012/news/10/30/international-players-on-opening-night-rosters/index.html.
247. See MITTEN ET AL., supra note 22, at 321.
248. INTERNATIONAL BASKETBALL FEDERATION, FIBA INTERNAL REGULATIONS,
bk. 3, ch. VII, § 289 (2010).
249. CAS STATUTES, supra note 227, § 1; INTERNATIONAL BASKETBALL FEDERATION,
supra note 248, at bk. 3, ch. VII, § 295.
250. BASKETBALL ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL, ARBITRATION RULES, R. 8.1 (2012)
[hereinafter BAT RULES], available at http://www.fiba.com/downloads/v3_expe/bat/BATArbi
trationRules1May2012.PDF.
251. Id. at R. 1.2–1.3.
252. Id. at R. 8.3.
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Id. at R. 9.1.
Id. at R. 11.2, 12.1.
Id. at R. 17.1.
Id. at R. 1.1.
Id. at R. 12.3.
Id. at R. 15.1.
Id. at R. 16.3–.4.
Id. at R. 17.3.
Id. at R. 0.2–.3.
See id. at R. 0.1, 1.2–.3, 3.1, 8.1, 12.1–.2, 15.1.
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To start a proceeding, a party must submit a complaint that contains
253
“[a]ll written evidence on which the Claimant intends to rely.” The
defendant is required to answer, but any additional filings will be
254
ignored unless the arbitrator requests them. Each hearing requires a
nominal fee depending on the value of the case that is no less than 1,500
255
euro, but no more than 7,000 euro. The arbitration can proceed only if
both parties agree in writing to arbitrate the dispute, typically through
256
an arbitration clause in the player’s contract. A quirk to this system is
that arbitrators can promote a settlement between the parties instead of
257
Arbitrators are not required to follow
the typical arbitration ruling.
any particular set of governing documents, but instead make rulings on
the general principles of fairness and justice, unless otherwise stipulated
258
Within six weeks of the
in the contract between the two parties.
hearing, the arbitrator must file an award, which is public unless
259
otherwise mandated by the arbitrator or the BAT President.
The
result of this award determines what party is responsible for paying
260
arbitration costs and the proportions of those costs.
This system was established to provide an effective, efficient, and
simple method of resolving disputes in the world of international
261
While some aspects of this structure are
professional basketball.
unrealistic to bring to the U.S., like the single arbitrator and the lack of
a code, there are other aspects that would make sense for American
professional sports leagues, such as, having the arbitrators selected by an
independent body and having them determine issues of jurisdiction,
262
These aspects could help to make the
evidence, and procedure.
system of discipline in American professional sports faster, more fair,
and more consistent.
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C. Another National Professional League: Australia’s NRL
Australia’s NRL is now governed by a system that includes a “Code
of Conduct, Anti-Doping Rules, Anti-Vilification Code, Judiciary Code
263
of Procedure and Appeals Committee Procedural Rules.”
Under
264
is administered
these rules, the discipline for on-field violence
according to a set of specific violations that have specific punishments
265
based on the grade of the offense. Further, each grade has an explicit
number of demerit points, which also contribute to developing the
266
Players are given written notice of a charge and have
punishment.
three options: plead guilty, plead guilty to the offense but not guilty to
267
the grade, or plead not guilty to the offense.
Moreover, players are
rewarded with a lesser point value if they plead guilty and get increased
268
points for repeat offenses.
This system works quickly and effectively because the match review
committee must submit the notice of offense the next business day after
269
The player then has one business day to respond either
the match.
270
with a guilty plea or notice that he will fight the charge. If he fights it,
the hearing is held the following day, with a potential for appeal for
271
procedural infractions the day after the hearing.
In all, this process
takes a maximum of four days to complete the entire process of
272
discipline and appeal.
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263. AUSTRALIAN RUGBY LEAGUE COMM’N, NRL JUDICIARY CODE OF PROCEDURE:
POLICY STATEMENT NO 1 OF 2012 (2012), available at http://media.dailytelegraph.com.au/m
ultimedia/2012/07/NRL_Judiciary_Polic.pdf; NAT’L RUGBY LEAGUE, CODE OF CONDUCT
(2007), available at http://www.rugbyleague.com.au/nrl/nrl_code_of_conduct.pdf; Dobinson &
Thorpe, supra note 226, at 110; NRL Judiciary Report, NRL.COM, http://www.nrl.com/nrlhq/r
eferencecentre/judiciary/tabid/10435/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2013).
264. Rugby is one of the most violent games in the world, but it is no more violent than
American football. See Homa Khaleeli, American Football or Rugby: Which is More
Dangerous?, SHORTCUTSBLOG (Jan. 28, 2013, 11:50 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/sp
ort/shortcuts/2013/jan/28/american-football-rugby-more-dangerous. Thus, an analysis of the
disciplinary system of violence in rugby should be just as easily administrated in football.
265. Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 226, at 124.
266. Id.; NRL Judiciary Report, supra note 263.
267. Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 226, at 124.
268. Id. at 124, 127.
269. Id. at 126–27.
270. Id. at 127.
271. Id.
272. Id. The NFL currently has a similar system for on-field conduct, as evidenced by
Ed Reed’s successful appeal. Jeff Zrebiec & Aaron Wilson, Reed’s Suspension Lifted: After
Successful Appeal on Helmet Hit, He Defends Hard-Nosed Style, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 21,
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The NRL has a judiciary branch that includes a Chairman, a
Judiciary Counsel, and an Adjudicating Panel, which consists of three
273
members.
The Chairman decides all questions of law, evidence, and
274
procedure, but does not participate in the decision of the appeal. This
Chairman must be serving, or have served, as a judge in either an
Australian state or federal court because the system is similar to a
criminal case where there is an emphasis on the fairness of the
275
proceedings to secure just outcomes.
The Judiciary Counsel is
276
The
responsible for prosecuting players on the league’s behalf.
Counsel is composed of former rugby league players who are also
277
attorneys.
This combination provides the legal formality to the
proceedings and has a prosecutor who truly understands the position the
278
players are in during the heat of competition. The ultimate decision of
whether a charge should stand rests with the Adjudicating Panel, which,
279
like the Counsel, is composed of former players. A group of three is
selected from a pool of five, and acts as the jury in the case, responding
to the cases presented by both sides and the burdens and standards
280
explained by the Chairman.
Video evidence is usually presented and all the evidence and the
281
grading are recorded so the Panel can follow precedent. The evidence
of a particular case must be included in the notice of charge document
282
that goes to the player so that he can develop a defense.
Like a
defendant in a criminal trial, the charged player’s previous suspensions
and fines are excluded from the hearing unless the Panel determines the
player is guilty, at which time the Panel needs to know the player’s
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2012, at D1. Ed Reed is a Pro-Bowl caliber safety who, while playing for the Baltimore
Ravens, was suspended by the League for an illegal hit because the League believed he had a
history of illegal hits. Id. On appeal, the League reduced the suspension to a fine because
Reed was able to show that he did not have the history as a repeat offender that the League
initially believed he had. Id.
273. Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 226, at 131.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 133.
277. Id.
278. See id. at 133–34.
279. Id. at 134.
280. Id. at 134–35.
281. Id. at 135.
282. Id. at 138.
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disciplinary past to decide the intensity of the punishment. If a player
wishes to appeal, he has a week to ask for an appeal from the Chairman,
284
who will grant it if there is a good likelihood of success.
An appeal is heard by the Appeals Committee, which can affirm,
quash, find the player guilty of a lesser offense, or increase the penalty
285
imposed on the player. These decisions are final and binding on the
286
parties and no new evidence may be entered.
Players must pay a
$5,000 security fee before the appeal, which they get back only if they
287
win, to avoid frivolous appeals. The Appeals Committee is a panel of
three people: the President of the Appeals Committee, who must have
served as a judge, and both the players association and the Chairman
288
This three-person panel has the final
selecting one person each.
authority to determine whether the decision was reasonable and
289
supported by evidence.
While some aspects of this system may not work in the United
States, the specificity of rules and punishments as well as former player
involvement in the process would vastly improve the current structure of
discipline in American sports leagues. While many of the leagues
currently have quick appeals for on-field conduct, there are aspects of
these three disciplinary systems that can make the American systems
290
more fair, consistent, and efficient.
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283. Id.
284. Id. at 141–42.
285. Id. at 142.
286. Id. at 142–43.
287. Id. at 143. The NRL salary cap is $5.15 million for the twenty-five highest paid
athletes. Salary Cap Breakdown: NRL Payments for the Top 25 2013 Cap, NRL.COM,
http://www.nrl.com/nrlhq/referencecentre/salarycap/tabid/10434/default.aspx (last visited Oct.
4, 2013). This equates to a maximum average salary of $176,000 per player, or just over 5% of
the average MLB player’s salary, less than 3.5% of the average NBA player’s salary, 7.3% of
the average NHL player’s salary, and only slightly higher than a typical NFL practice squad
player. See Joe Dorish, Average Salaries in the NBA, NFL, MLB, and NHL, YAHOO SPORTS
(Nov. 12, 2011), http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news?slug=ycn-10423863; Brian McIntyre, New
England Patriots Have Top-Paid NFL Practice Squad, NFL.COM (Sept. 7, 2012, 7:52 AM),
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap1000000059339/article/new-england-patriots-have-toppaidnfl-practice-squad; MLB Salaries, CBSSPORTS.COM, http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/salaries/
avgsalaries (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
288. Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 226, at 143.
289. Id. at 143–44.
290. See MLB CBA, supra note 54, at art. XI, § C; NFL CBA, supra note 72, at art. 46.
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V. APPLICABLE ASPECTS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE UNITED
STATES LEGAL SYSTEM
The structure of the U.S. court systems generally involves a lower
court that initially hears cases and at least one appellate court in the
291
Traditionally, lower court
jurisdiction that hears potential review.
determinations of fact face a clearly erroneous standard of review by
appellate courts, whereas the lower court’s legal holdings are reviewed
292
Further, a lower court judge’s discretionary decision is
de novo.
293
usually reviewed under an “abuse of discretion” standard. All appeals
in this system are conducted by a completely separate court to reduce,
294
and ideally eliminate, the potential for bias. The established appellate
procedure not only serves to preserve justice, but also as a check on
295
lower court judges.
One of the biggest concerns about lower court
296
judges is maintaining impartiality, or at least the perception of it.
Congress understands the importance of this perception, which is
why it codified the requirement that a judge disqualify herself if her
297
impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.” The judge is supposed
298
to act sua sponte and recuse herself.
However, if a judge does not
recuse herself, either party may file a motion to remove the judge from
the proceeding by filing an affidavit with the facts and reasons why the
299
The goal is to eliminate bias and
party believes the judge is biased.
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291. See 1 RALPH A. ROSSUM & G. ALAN TARR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT 31 (8th ed. 2010); Structure of Federal Courts,
USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/get-informed/federal-courtbasics/structure-federal-courts.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
292. Kevin Casey et al., Standards of Appellate Review in the Federal Circuit: Substance
and Semantics, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 279, 285–86 (2002); Chad M. Oldfather & Matthew M.
Fernholz, Comparative Procedure on a Sunday Afternoon: Instant Replay in the NFL as a
Process of Appellate Review, 43 IND. L. REV. 45, 54 (2009).
293. Casey et al., supra note 292, at 286, 309–11; Oldfather & Fernholz, supra note 292,
at 54.
294. Oldfather & Fernholz, supra note 292, at 64.
295. See id. at 66.
296. Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s
Impartiality “Might Reasonably Be Questioned,” 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 66–67 (2000).
Other important features of the legal system include the right to be heard, notice of laws and
charges, the right to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to receive a reasoned decision.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, DESIGN FOR LIBERTY: PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATI
ON, AND THE RULE OF LAW 20–21 (2011).
297. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006).
298. Abramson, supra note 296, at 70.
299. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2006); Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1,
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enhance public confidence in the justice system by employing an
objective test of whether a disinterested observer would significantly
300
doubt the judge’s impartiality.
To demonstrate the importance of public confidence further, the
American Bar Association (ABA) published a model rule titled:
301
The rule states: “A judge
“Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary.”
shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid
302
By including the
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”
appearance of impropriety, the ABA recognizes that public perception
of the system is nearly as important, if not more so, than the justice of
the system itself, and that the public will distrust a system that is not
303
impartial.
The language in that rule is very similar to the reasoning
304
behind granting the commissioner a best interest power.
VI. AMERICAN SPORTS ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL (ASAT)
The ASAT would incorporate some particularly effective
components from each of the professional American sports CBAs as
well as the international systems previously assessed in Part IV.
However, various aspects of the ASAT would create new and unique
processes for handling disciplinary appeals to make the system as fair,
efficient, and effective as possible. This Part will explain the structure of
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23–24 (1994).
300. CHARLES GARDNER GEYH ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 4.05 (5th
ed. 2013); Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 87
IOWA L. REV. 1213, 1233 (2002). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the objective
reasonable prudent person standard to determine the judge’s ability to be impartial.
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 887 (2009). The Court found a judge must
recuse himself if the case involved someone who had given him significant campaign
contributions. Id. at 886–87.
301. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2011). A concept first articulated by
James Madison, who recognized that men cannot completely control their biases and must be
protected from themselves for the good of the public. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 55 (James
Madison) (Harvard University Press 2009). Ironically, it was such a crisis of confidence that
led to the MLB making Judge Landis the first commissioner. See supra notes 25–27 and
accompanying text.
302. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2011) (asterisks omitted).
303. Id. at R. 1.2 cmt. 3.
304. Compare MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2011) (requiring that a
judge act to promote public confidence in the independence of the judiciary), with MAJOR
LEAGUE CONST. art. II, §§ 2–3 (2008), available at http://bizofbaseball.com/docs/MLCons
ititutionJune2005Update.pdf (explaining the commissioner’s responsibility to promote the
best interests of baseball).
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the ASAT, including how the procedures would work, and will explore
the potential feasibility of the proposed ASAT.
A. The Creation and Maintenance of the ASAT
Like the CAS and BAT, the ASAT would be an independent body
with its own governing documents and code, regardless of the sport
305
involved in the dispute.
The separate code would establish the
structure of the proceedings and codify rules that arbitrators must abide
306
by when making decisions. Similar to the CAS, the ASAT would be
composed of a group of established arbitrators that have experience in
307
one of the major North American arbitration associations,
308
international sports arbitral tribunals, a similarly structured court
around the world, or any independent arbitrator who can show
309
sufficiently related experience and education. The tribunal would be
composed of at least ten original arbitrators (the Board), who would
have to apply and be appointed by the participating leagues and players’
310
associations. Like the NRL structure, former-athletes could apply for
a position on the ASAT if they can prove in their applications that they
have legal experience or training, or related skills that would enable
311
them to effectively adjudicate these types of hearings. Using a similar
election policy as the CAS, the Board would then select ten more; that
group of twenty would then select ten more, and so on until at least fifty
312
By having the Board select these
arbitrators had been appointed.
arbitrators, it is much less likely that an arbitrator would feel a
responsibility to rule on behalf of one of the parties in the dispute.
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305. See supra Part IV.A–B.
306. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
307. For example, the International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution, the
AAA, and the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services.
308. For example, the CAS, the BAT, and the International Arbitration Association.
Additionally, anyone who has served as a league arbitrator would have sufficient experience
to be considered.
309. The decision regarding whether the independent arbitrator has sufficient
experience and education would be at the discretion of the Board.
310. Ideally the NBA, NBPA, MLB, MLBPA, NFL, NFLPA, NHL, and NHLPA would
all participate, but there would be no bar on what league could participate. The only
requirement would be incorporating language into its governing documents giving the ASAT
authority to function effectively.
311. See Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 226, at 133. A fund would also be created from
the fines to provide for athletes’ post-career legal education to help prepare athletes for this
position.
312. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
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313. BAT RULES, supra note 250, at R. 8.3; CAS STATUTES, supra note 227, § 18; MLB
CBA, supra note 54, at art. XI, § A(9).
314. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012).
315. BAT RULES, supra note 250, at R. 8.3; CAS PROCEDURAL RULES, supra note 235,
at R. 34.
316. 9 U.S.C. § 10.
317. CAS PROCEDURAL RULES, supra note 235, at R. 43; CAS STATUTES, supra note
227, § 19.
318. See supra Part III.C.
319. See supra Part III.
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Whenever an arbitrator retired or was discharged, the members of the
ASAT would have the duty to select a replacement if there were fewer
than fifty left; if there were more than fifty, the members would have
discretion as to whether to add a replacement. Maintaining at least fifty
qualified arbitrators is important to prevent any one arbitrator from
dealing with a particular league too frequently.
As in most of the organizations discussed previously, the arbitrators
would be expected to perform their duties objectively and
313
independently and would be subject to the standards of the code as
314
well as the requirements of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
315
Adapting the CAS and BAT policies, either party would have the
right to challenge the decision based on the FAA requirements for
316
disclosure, impartiality, abuse of power, and misconduct. This policy
would provide a safeguard for players or leagues that do not get a fair
hearing or decision. While the decisions of the panels would be public,
all proceedings, documents, and statistics, including the identity of the
arbitrators, would be confidential, and if any party were to reveal any
confidential information, that party would be subject to a substantial
317
fine, similar to CAS decisions.
All arbitrators could be fired by any league or association during a
318
specified week in the summer each year, similar to the NBA CBA;
however, unlike the current structures for the American professional
sports leagues, this request for dismissal must be accompanied by just
319
This requirement would protect arbitrators
cause for termination.
from retribution from one party simply because the arbitrator ruled
against that party, and increase the public’s view of the integrity of the
system. These requests would be handled in a confidential manner so
the arbitrator would be unaware of who requested the termination, but
would know the reasoning for the request. The Board would review the
request and determine whether to keep the arbitrator on staff. These
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procedures would ensure that the accused arbitrators never learn the
organization that accused them, so the arbitrators cannot develop a bias
against the organization if the Board decides to keep the arbitrator on
staff. This system would prevent dismissals and requests without merit
and bring accountability to the leagues requesting dismissal.
Slightly altering the NBA system, which lets the commissioner
320
decide on small fines and penalties, the ASAT would have at least
three arbitrators on call for small issues that could be settled much more
quickly than the large issues, which may require a full trial process. The
determination of which disputes would be considered small and which
would be considered large would be handled by the leagues in their
321
Similar to BAT arbitrators,
CBAs and not codified by the ASAT.
ASAT arbitrators would have the authority to broker an agreement
322
between the parties, or make an independent decision. This approach
would allow the leagues to determine which discipline they believe must
be determined quickly and efficiently to maintain justice, such as cases
the facts would be relatively straightforward. Further, the leagues
would define the issues and punishments that would require intensive
fact-finding and a larger investigation, which would require a longer,
more court-like trial. Removing the commissioner entirely from the
appeals procedure would bring greater integrity to each sport because it
would remove the chance of bias or partiality, or at least the public’s
perception of it.
B. The Small Dispute Process

See supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text.
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
BAT RULES, supra note 250, at R. 12.3.
Id. at R. 8.1.
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The small issues would be handled by a single arbitrator, like BAT
323
These small hearings would involve both parties and
arbitrations.
would be conducted via video or telephone conference to eliminate the
costs and delay of travel. The complainant would be required to
provide written notice to both the ASAT and the opposing party, who
would be required to file an answer within two business days. The
conference would take place at a time agreed upon by the parties, but
no later than two business days after the ASAT received the answer and
no more than five days after the filing of the complaint. This timetable
would ensure the efficient resolution of these disputes and would get
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innocent players back playing as early as possible. Similar to the power
of the NBA Commissioner, the arbitrator would have authority to
324
affirm or reduce the league’s decision, but not to increase it.
The
parties would make the entirety of their arguments during this hearing,
and there would be no required brief or discovery process because of
the limited facts involved. The parties would need to provide any
evidence they believe necessary to convince the arbitrator with during
this conference so the opposing party would have a chance to dispute it.
Like the decisions of most of the leagues’ arbitrators, these decisions
325
would be final and binding. Due to the limited fact-finding required,
these smaller disputes would likely be resolved quickly. All decisions
would be documented to establish a system of precedent, so the disputes
could be resolved fairly and referenced in future cases.
This
documentation would make sure the players know exactly what type of
conduct would make them liable for specific suspensions and fines and
would eliminate the ambiguity that currently exists under the CBAs.
C. The Large Dispute Process

C M
Y K

03/17/2014 11:30:34

324. NBA CBA, supra note 192, at art. XXXI, § 9(a)(4).
325. BAT RULES, supra note 250, at R. 16.5; CAS PROCEDURAL RULES, supra note
235, at R. 46; MLB CBA, supra note 54, at art. XI, § B; NBA CBA, supra note 192, at art.
XXXI, § 6; NFL CBA, supra note 72, at art. 46, § 2(d); Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 226,
at 142–43.
326. CAS PROCEDURAL RULES, supra note 235, at R. 50.
327. Id. at R. 40.2. This algorithm would prevent the arbitrators from becoming too
familiar with any particular league or players association, which would avoid any previous
biases from coming into play even subconsciously. The system benefits from the arbitrators’
legal and analytical skills rather than their familiarity with any particular sport.
Unfortunately, the author is not a mathematician and unable to present an example of said
algorithm.
328. NBA CBA, supra note 192, at art. XXXI, § 9(a)(4).
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Large disputes would be heard by a panel of three impartial
326
Differing from the CAS
arbitrators, similar to CAS proceedings.
system, these arbitrators would be randomly selected and an algorithm
would be created to prevent any individual arbitrator from hearing
327
disputes predominantly from one sport. Like the power of the NBA
328
Commissioner, the panel would have authority to affirm or reduce the
league’s decision, but not to increase it. Additionally, comparable to the
NRL system, these decisions would be documented and would set
precedent for each league that would be applicable in similar future
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329. Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 226, at 135.
330. See supra notes 49–53, 64 and accompanying text.
331. Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 226, at 138.
332. NFL CBA, supra note 72, at art. 46, § 1(d).
333. Id. at art. 46, § 2(i); Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 226, at 124–27. As opposed to
the NBA system, which allows for a much greater timeframe. NBA CBA, supra note 192, at
art. XXXI, § 4.
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situations per league.
Moreover, the totality of the circumstances
would come into play for each hearing to prevent a player who went
through reasonable efforts to make sure he was not breaking the rules
330
Thus, no punishments
from being disciplined, like J.C. Romero.
would be handed out with a strict liability standard, and all appellants
would have the opportunity to truly clear their name.
The ASAT would not hand out discipline; it would still be up to the
individual leagues to determine the rules and punishments and to
initially enforce those rules. Instead, the tribunal would only be used
when the punished player disputed the discipline and wished to appeal
the decision. The arbitrators would analyze the league’s decision based
on the league’s governing documents and a reasoned brief submitted by
the league. This brief would provide the ASAT with any evidence, such
as previous conduct or applicable precedent, that it would need to
confirm the decision and so that the player could effectively make his or
331
her defense, akin to the NRL system. Additionally, if the CBAs still
had ambiguous language, like the NFL’s “flagrant and gratuitous”
332
standard for increasing fines and suspensions, then the brief would
need to clarify the explicit type of conduct that would result in the
increased penalty by giving examples of past suspensions or fines for
similar conduct by players in similar situations. This brief would have to
be submitted within five business days of the written notice of the
player’s appeal to keep the process efficient.
The hearing would take place between a week and ten days after the
notice of appeal, and the parties would submit briefs to the ASAT panel
333
at least two days in advance, similar to the NRL and NFL structures.
Though not required, a player would have the right to be represented by
an attorney or a union representative. The appellant player would have
to prove that the league was being arbitrary and capricious, abusing its
power, or not following its own rules in handing down the particular
discipline. The player could use the totality of the circumstances,
including on- and off-court conduct, other players’ punishments, and
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any other evidence that could show injustice. The league would also
have the right to participate in the hearing, but would not be required to
334
participate if the evidence submitted in the brief was sufficient. Like
the CAS policy, discovery requests would be granted at the panel’s
335
discretion. Further, the player would be entitled to any evidence used
336
The hearing would
in the investigation, much like the MLB system.
not have a particular time limit, but must allow for each party to present
all of its evidence to ensure justice. Arbitrators would publish a
reasoned decision for each case, which the league could then use as a
basis for how to handle future situations. These publications would be
anonymous, like the CAS decisions, unless the appellant waived his or
her right to privacy. This documentation would hopefully prevent
future disputes because players would better understand the likely
penalties for their actions and the league would be able to look at
precedential decisions to determine future discipline. Like the decisions
of most of the leagues’ arbitrators, these decisions would be final and
337
binding.
D. Funding the ASAT and Understanding the Fees
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334. The league could be represented by any active member of the commissioner’s office
who participated in the original disciplinary decision.
335. CAS PROCEDURAL RULES, supra note 235, at R. 44.3.
336. MLB CBA, supra note 54, at art. XII, § D.
337. BAT RULES, supra note 250, at R. 16.5; CAS PROCEDURAL RULES, supra note
235, at R. 46; MLB CBA, supra note 54, at art. XI, § B; NBA CBA, supra note 192, at art.
XXXI, § 6; NFL CBA, supra note 72, at art. 46, § 2(d); Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 226,
at 142–43.
338. The incremental expenses could be imposed for excessively long hearings,
procedures to strike a particular arbitrator for a previous relationship with a party, or similar
circumstances that would make that particular hearing longer and more difficult than the
norm, similar to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
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The Board and arbitrators would be paid using only the arbitration
rates, for which there would be two base rates, one for small issues and
one for large, and additional incremental increases as would be
338
These rates would be determined by the
explained in the code.
average of the fair market rates of the major North American
arbitration agencies. These fees would be shared equally by the union
representing the player and the league, but would be refunded to the
winning party by the opposing side. Any fines that the panel affirms
would be payable to the league and the league would follow its own
CBA to determine the use of those funds. Embracing an element of the
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339

NFL’s CBA, any fine imposed by the arbitrators for conduct against
the rules of the ASAT, such as disclosure of confidential information,
unreasonable delay, or bad faith, would be directly paid to the ASAT,
which would delegate the funds to one of five selected charities based on
340
the recommendation of the opposing party. Like the BAT system, the
arbitrator would determine what proportion of expenses each side
would be required to pay, with the exception that parties would be
341
Further, the panel could award
responsible for their own witnesses.
attorney’s fees if it found that one party acted in bad faith or filed a
frivolous claim. These rules would make sure that no athlete would be
unable to bring a case due to expense, and would guarantee that the
arbitrators would be paid a fair rate, and that neither party would
unduly delay the proceedings or act with malice because of the
repercussions of fines.
E. The Potential Obstacles to Creating the ASAT
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339. NFL CBA, supra note 72, at art. 46, § 5(c).
340. One of these would be an athlete education fund, which would grant scholarships to
retired athletes looking to gain a legal education to eventually become an arbitrator.
341. BAT RULES, supra note 250, at R. 17.3.
342. See 1 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS § 4.9 (Gary A. Uberstine
ed., 2012); Chris Deubert et al., All Four Quarters: A Retrospective and Analysis of the 2011
Collective Bargaining Process and Agreement in the National Football League, 19 UCLA ENT.
L. REV. 1, 7 (2012).
343. Parlow, supra note 2, at 203.
344. Deubert et al., supra note 342, at 11–14.
345. Id. at 44–63, 65–66.
346. Id. at 63–65.
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Historically, CBA negotiations have often focused around monetary
342
issues. The current state of the economy has only made these issues
343
more important and made it more difficult to come to an agreement.
These issues have included free agency, salary caps, wage restrictions,
344
and revenue splits.
In fact, during the most recent collective
bargaining negotiations between the NFL and NFLPA, the most
significant changes were in terms of the revenue split, the salary cap and
minimum spending requirements, bonus forfeitures, rookie
345
compensation, guaranteed contracts, and drug testing.
While the NFL Commissioner’s disciplinary power had been a
popular topic of discussion and most players were not happy with it, the
346
This phenomenon is
new CBA left the structure nearly unchanged.
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not unique to the NFL; the new NBA CBA also involved mostly
changes to monetary issues, and did not address disciplinary
347
provisions.
Similarly, the new MLB Basic Agreement involved a
variety of changes to monetary issues, but, other than a change to drug
348
testing, no other mentions of disciplinary provisions.
These most
recent CBA negotiations suggest that disciplinary issues are not very
important to the players or the players’ unions.
Since it is highly unlikely that during the next round of CBA
negotiations disciplinary appeals will suddenly become more important,
it is probably up to the leagues to take the issue of fair appellate
procedure up themselves. However, doing so would involve giving up a
significant power that the leagues have over the players, which would
likely be met by the leagues asking for the players to give up more
money in exchange, which they are very unlikely to do. Therefore, it is
unlikely that there will be any disciplinary changes in the major
American sports leagues, let alone something as drastic as this
Comment proposes; however, similar systems have been established in
349
other nations and internationally, showing that it can be done.
Unfortunately, this means that the players and the fans will likely have
to deal with a system that is unfair, inconsistent, and inflexible.
VII. CONCLUSION
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347. Larry Coon, Breaking Down Changes in New CBA, ESPN.COM (Dec. 3, 2011, 9:01
PM), http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/page/CBA-111128/how-new-nba-deal-compares-last-one.
348. See Anthony DiComo, Key Points of Collective Bargaining Agreement, MLB.COM
(Nov. 22, 2011, 2:45 PM), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20111122&content_id=26
026776.
349. See DEBORAH HEALEY, SPORT AND THE LAW 177–81 (4th ed. 2009).
350. NFL CBA, supra note 72, at art. 46, § 1(a), (d); see also MLB CBA, supra note 54,
at art. XII, § A–B, NBA CBA, supra note 192, at art. XXXI, § 9.
351. NBA CBA, supra note 192, at art. VI; NFL PCP, supra note 78; see also supra text
accompanying note 185.
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Whether the ASAT is a realistic concept that can effectively be
incorporated into the American sports governance structure remains to
be seen. One thing is certain, changes need to be made. The current
disciplinary provisions in the CBAs of the four major American
professional sports leagues are ambiguous, at best, as to what conduct
will result in punishment, and the extent of the punishment that will be
350
handed down. The NFL and NBA have attempted to create conduct
351
policies, which work to varying degrees, but that does not fully
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encompass the breadth of conduct for which they have doled out
discipline. Too many of these decisions are arbitrary and without
352
sufficient reasoning.
Furthermore, the system of appeals that allows the commissioner’s
office to hear an appeal on discipline it handed out is a clear conflict of
interest that must be removed from the system to give it more
353
integrity. As was evidenced in Part II, a commissioner will rarely, if
354
ever, overturn or reduce a punishment that he had a hand in creating.
The current state of disciplinary systems in the American sports world is
355
in disarray, as exemplified by the Bounty-Gate mess in the NFL, the
356
Ryan Braun situation in the MLB, and the punishment of the San
357
Antonio Spurs in the NBA, as well as many other situations. This
problem will not likely be fixed by each league’s next CBA unless it is
explicitly brought up beforehand. CBA negotiations too often focus
358
only on the money and leave the rest of the CBA alone. Thus, it is a
burden on the leagues themselves to more explicitly lay out what
conduct will be disciplined, and the specifics of the punishments, similar
359
to the NRL governing documents. Unfortunately, leagues are unlikely
to do so because it would require transparency in the disciplinary
process and giving up discretionary power.
Therefore, although the proposed arbitral body would increase the
fairness, consistency, and flexibility of the current systems, it will not
likely be implemented and the disciplinary procedures of each league is
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352. See supra notes 78–79, 86–90, 118–22 and accompanying text.
353. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
354. See supra Part II.
355. See supra notes 85–95 and accompanying text.
356. See Belson, supra note 23.
357. See supra notes 126–29 and accompanying text.
358. As evidenced by the NHL’s recent CBA negotiations that resulted in a lockout, as
well as the recent NBA and NFL lockouts that produced little to no change in the disciplinary
provisions of the CBA. See Howard Beck, N.B.A. Reaches Tentative Deal to Save Season,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2011, at A1 (detailing changes in NBA CBA after lockout); Katie
Carrera, The NHL CBA: Analyzing What’s New, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/sports/capitals/2013/cba/index.html (detailing the
major changes to the NHL CBA after the lockout); Mike Garafolo, NFL, Referees End
Lockout After Reaching New Labor Deal, USA TODAY (Sept. 27, 2012, 1:52 AM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/nfl/story/2012/09/27/nfl-referees-end-lockout-afterreaching-new-labor-deal/57846906/1 (detailing the major issues negotiated during the NFL
referee’s lockout).
359. Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 226, at 110–11; see also supra notes 263–68 and
accompanying text.
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likely to remain unchanged until a tremendous scandal makes it
necessary in order to preserve the integrity of the game.
JEREMY R. ABRAMS*
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